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Abstract
Private-Key Fully Homomorphic Encryption for Private Classification of Medical Data
by
Alexander Nicolas Wood

Advisor: Professor Delaram Kahrobaei

A wealth of medical data is inaccessible to researchers and clinicians due to privacy
restrictions such as HIPAA. Clinicians would benefit from access to predictive models for
diagnosis, such as classification of tumors as malignant or benign, without compromising
patients’ privacy. In addition, the medical institutions and companies who own these medical
information systems wish to keep their models private when used by outside parties.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables practical polynomial computation over
encrypted data. This dissertation begins with coverage of speed and security improvements to
existing private-key fully homomorphic encryption methods. Next this dissertation presents
a protocol for third-party private search using private-key FHE. Finally, fully homomorphic
protocols for polynomial machine learning algorithms are presented using privacy-preserving
Naive Bayes and Decision Tree classifiers. These protocols allow clients to privately classify
their data points without direct access to the learned model. Experiments using these
classifiers are run using publicly available medical data sets.
These protocols are applied to the task of privacy-preserving classification of real-world
medical data. Results show that private-key fully homomorphic encryption is able to provide
fast and accurate results for privacy-preserving medical classification.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The fields of machine learning and cryptography rose to prominence and experienced rapid
development in the past few decades. Cryptography, in particular, revolutionized the world,
from Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman’s asymmetric encryption scheme in 1976 to the
current prevalence of online shopping. Machine learning was spearheaded in the 50s with
Alan Turing’s “Turing Test,” Arthur Samuel’s checkers program, and Frank Rosenblatt’s
perceptron. Now, machine learning permeates our lives via automatic online recommendations, self-driving cars, and more. Machine learning techniques applied to medical data have
led to great leaps forward in the medical field, with applications in personalized treatment,
disease diagnosis, radiology, and more [13, 24].
Despite this the two sub disciplines have remained relatively separate. As postulated
by Rivest, the fields of cryptography and machine learning at first appear to be opposites;
cryptography, on the one hand, seeks to hide information, while machine learning looks to
discover information [35, 58]. However antithetical it may appear at first, machine learning
and cryptography are bound to be intertwined. The more easily data is available, the greater
the need for privacy, and data is gathered faster than ever before.
The need for privacy has a direct application to medical data. Information storage costs
1
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continue to decrease while personal medical applications, such as genome sequencing, are
increasingly accessible. Websites such as 23andme, LifeNome, and Ancestry.com provide the
first wave of commercially available personalized genetic analysis. A breach in the privacy
of this data could leave a subject particularly vulnerable, as we are uniquely identified by
our genetic code. As technology advances so do the insights gained from genetic analysis,
and as time goes on the risk involved with sharing your genetic data could increase. The
implications of this data being shared in a publicly identifiable way could have an unforeseen
negative impact upon a person’s life. Strict privacy guidelines should be applied to genetic
information.
Furthermore, considered collectively these patients’ records represent a wealth of data
that has already been collected by various research institutions and hospitals. The ability
to use this information without compromising the privacy of these patients would impact
the field of computational medicine. In particular, training classification models on a singlesource data set can lead to over-fitting. This yields a learned model with excellent results on
the testing data but unpredictable results when applied to new data [51]. Medical researchers
could use private classification methods to verify that their model can generalize to an
external database.
In addition, privacy is a growing concern in medical applications as more assisted decision
making and diagnosis systems become commercially available. Owners of these systems do
not wish to share their models. Similarly, hospitals and clinicians are unwilling to share
their patients’ data due to privacy restrictions such as The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) [47]. Clinicians would benefit from access to private
classification protocols which allow them to access these diagnosis systems without having
to reveal patient information. Thus, there are two opposing forces at work: the desire
to analyze all available data in order to increase knowledge and sophistication of machine
learning techniques, as well as the need for privacy and control over what information we
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share.
The field of fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) seeks to bridge this gap. Theoretically, a fully homomorphic encryption scheme allows for computation of arbitrary functions
over encrypted data without first performing decryption. Current research into encrypted
computation over medical data employs fully homomorphic public-key cryptosystems, which
enable secure communication between multiple parties over insecure channels via asymmetric key distribution. Private-key cryptosystems require prior knowledge of the encryption/decryption key(s). In other words, if multiple parties wish to perform decryption in a
private-key setting, they must first exchange keys over a secure channel. While this is considered a disadvantage of private-key cryptosystems when the goal is purely communication,
these cryptosystems are suitable for medical applications. Due to HIPAA restraints and the
personal nature of genomic and medical data, it makes sense that those who hold medical
data would not, in fact, want anyone besides themselves to have the option of encrypting
the data [36].

1.1

Contribution

This dissertation addresses the use of private-key fully homomorphic encryption for design
of efficient private classification algorithms in medical applications. Security of these classification algorithms, simply put, corresponds a two-party protocol between a Client and a
Model Owner. The Client should learn no unnecessary information at the end of the protocol about the model owned by the Model Owner, and the Model Owner should learn no
information about the Client’s input. “Unnecessary information” is a vague term which is
clarified in the formal security discussions. Put abstractly, this qualification references the
fact that privacy-preserving classification necessitates the sharing of some information about
the Model Owner’s model – for instance, the final classification of the Client’s data within
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that model. Beyond their classification, Clients should learn no unnecessary information
about a Model Owner’s model. Some privacy-preserving classification protocols may take
place with an intermediary Server between the Client and Model Owner. In this case, the
Server should only perform computation, and should learn no unnecessary information about
the Client’s data point(s) or the Model Owner’s model(s).
The research in this dissertation provides privacy-preserving classification algorithms
using private-key fully homomorphic encryption for Naive Bayes and decision tree classifiers.
Implementation of these algorithms requires the construction of additional protocols. In
particular, this dissertation presents algorithms for the private computation of the argmax
function, a third-party private search protocol, and algorithms for efficiently implementing
private-key FHE.
Experimental results on real-world medical data sets show that these classifiers are able to
provide fast and accurate classification results. Specifically, information gathered from breast
tumor biopsies [45] is classified as malignant or benign using the proposed privacy-preserving
protocols. Experimental results on the efficiency third party private search protocol are also
presented.
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. Terminology is defined in Chapter
2. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the history of fully homomorphic encryption and
privacy-preserving classification as well as current state-of-the-art techniques. Chapter 4
proposes methodology for implementation of private-key fully homomorphic encryption, such
as encoding methods and parallelization techniques. Chapter 5 presents a privacy-preserving
Naive Bayes protocol using private-key FHE as well as experimental results. Chapter 6
presents a third-party private search protocol, and Chapter 7 presents a privacy-preserving
decision tree classifier as well as experimental results. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by
summarizing the contributions.

Chapter 2
Terminology
2.1

Machine Learning

Machine learning broadly seeks to learn new information from a given data set [39]. A
data set has some features which are used to use to predict some quantitative or categorical
outcomes. A supervised learning problem in machine learning operates by using a set of
training data to draw conclusions about the relationship between features of the data and
outcomes. These conclusions are used to create a learner, which predicts the outcome of any
new data points.
When selecting parameters for a supervised learning problem, it is important to keep in
mind the bias-variance tradeoff. While the goal of machine learning is to model the specifics
of the training data in a method that generalizes well to other data, it is often not possible
to do both simultaneously. As the complexity of the model is decreased, the variance tends
to decrease while the bias increases. This means that the learned model may be simpler
and will not overfit on new data, but it will underfit on the training data. On the other
hand, a more complicated model tends to have increased variance with decreased bias. This
means that there is a higher risk of overfitting the model on training data. Thus, with any
5

6
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supervised learning problem it is important to seek a balance between bias and variance.

Classification is the task of predicting a qualitative output value, often called a class,
from a set of input values. These input values, the dependent variables, may be discrete
or continuous. A discrete variable takes its value from a discrete, or countable, set. A
continuous variable can take on an infinite number of possible values [39]. In computational
medicine we often deal with discrete class values. A common application in computational
medicine is binary classification, where there two categories in which the data points reside,
represented as {0, 1} or {−1, 1}, often called targets. Binary classification is used for disease
prediction, for example, “has cancer” or “does not have cancer.”
Feature selection is a pre-processing method which identifies the most relevant features
of a data set. By restricting learning to these useful features and eliminating irrelevant
or redundant features, classification models’ performance may be increased [37]. Because
implementation of fully homomorphic encryption and other privacy-preserving measures can
lead to a large increase in classification time, it is important that learning is carried out on
only this relevant data.

2.1.1

Performance Measures

The performance of binary classification algorithms is evaluating using a variety of performance measures. Let TP, TN, FP, and FN denote True Positive, True Negative, False
Positive, and False Negative, respectively. Let P and N denote the total number of positive
and negative data points in the testing set. One measure called accuracy is calculated as

Accuracy =

TP + TN
P+N

and yields the proportion of data points that were correctly classified.
Other performance measures include sensitivity, precision, specificity, and negative pre-
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dictive value (NPV). The first two are given by
TP
TP + FN
TP
Precision =
.
TP + FP

Sensitivity =

Sensitivity provides a measure of what proportion of positive cases were classified correctly as
positive, while precision provides a measure of what proportion of cases classified as positive
were positive in reality. Sensitivity is especially important in medical applications as it is
critical to correctly identify all true positive cases [52].
Specificity and NPV are also known as inverse recall and inverse precision, as they provide similar information for negative classifications. Specificity describes the proportion of
negative cases that were classified as negative and NPV describes the proportion of cases
classified as negative that were negative in reality. They are computed as
TN
TN + FP
TN
NPV =
.
TN + FN

Specificity =

The F1 score provides the harmonic mean of precision and sensitivity and is given by

F1 =

2 · TP
.
2 · TP + FP + FN

Other performance measures occasionally seen include the false positive rate (FPR), also
known as fallout, and the false negative rate (FNR). These measures are calculated as
FP
FP + TN
FN
.
FNR =
TP + FN

Fallout =
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Figure 2.1: PPC Between the Client and Model Owner
These calculate the proportion of negative values which are wrongly classified as positives
and the proportion of positive values which are wrongly classified as negatives.

2.2

Privacy-Preserving Classification

We wish to specifically look at machine learning applications in the medical field. Privacy
restrictions such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) necessitate the development of private classification algorithms. Privacy-preserving classification
describes the collection of efficient methods for privately performing the classification stage
of a machine learning algorithm [6], while privacy-preserving data-mining describes the task
of training a model entirely over encrypted data [1]. Privacy-preserving classification is the
focus of this work. Introductory background on privacy-preserving data-mining is available
in the literature review in Chapter 3.
During privacy-preserving classification, Clients classifies their data vector using a model
owned by the Model Owner. Each party would like to keep their information private – Clients
do not want the Model Owner to learn any partial information about their data vectors, and
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t
Figure 2.2: PPC with Computation on Server
the Data Owner does not want the Clients to learn any unnecessary information about her
model.
For example, the Model Owner could be an institution that used its own collected data
to create a model. The Client could then be clinicians who use the privacy-preserving
classification in order to assist with the treatment of their patients. The Model Owner may
or may not wish to delegate computation to a cloud service provider, which we will call
the Server. Figure 2.1 shows the outline of the protocol carried out between the Client and
the Model Owner. Figure 2.2 shows the protocol as carried out between the Client, Model
Owner, and an intermediary Server.

2.2.1

Model

The discussion that follows is based off of the notation and presentations given by Hastie
[39] and Bost et al. [6]. Throughout this paper notation is as follows: The Client has data in

CHAPTER 2. TERMINOLOGY

10

Figure 2.3: The SIMD Paradigm
the form of d-dimensional vectors X = (X1 , X2 , . . . , Xd ). X is called a feature vector, while
each Xi in X is called a feature.
The Client wishes to classify his data using a classification function f , known only by the
Model Owner, into a set of discrete classes G. Observed classes will be denoted G whereas
predicted classes denoted with a hat, Ĝ. A large amount of training data is used to construct
a classifier, say N inputs, each written as a feature vector-class pair (X, Gi ).

2.3

Parallelization via SIMD

The Single-Instruction Multiple-Data (SIMD) paradigm is a class of parallel computers.
SIMD allows for computation of multiple values under a single instruction. Figure 2.2 shows
the general concept, where multiple inputs are encoded within a single vector. A single
instruction operates on this vector, and decoding the output vector yields the output of the
instruction on each of the individual inputs. A common example is that of image processing,
where a filter is applied to every pixel in an image [18].
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Fully Homomorphic Encryption

One major approach to the task of privacy-preserving classification uses fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE). Homomorphic encryption was first conceptualized in 1978 by Rivest,
Adleman, and Dertouzos, envisioned originally as a ‘privacy transformation,’ which would
enable computation of functions on encrypted data without first having to decrypt the information [57]. This concept is known today as a homomorphic encryption scheme, informally
defined as allowing for computation of functions over encrypted data. A homomorphic encryption scheme is called fully homomorphic if it allows for computation of arbitrary functions
over encrypted data.
The algorithms that comprise a public key homomorphic encryption scheme E are defined
as follows:
I. (pk, sk) = KeyGenE (n), the key generation algorithm, which distributes public and private keys pk and sk (respectively) to all necessary parties given some security parameter
n.
II. c = EncryptE (m, pk), the encryption algorithm, which takes as input pk as well as a
message m. The output is a ciphertext c.
III. m = DecryptE (c, sk), the decryption algorithm, which uses the private key(s) sk to
recover the plaintext m given a ciphertext c.
As E is a homomorphic public key encryption system, it is able to carry out computations
over some set of circuits C by utilizing an additional algorithm:
IV. c = EvaluateE (c1 , c2 , . . . , cn , C, pk), an algorithm to perform computation over encrypted data. The input to this function is a collection of ciphertexts c1 , c2 , . . . , ct , a
circuit C ∈ C, and the public key(s) from the key generation algorithm.
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Formally, the encryption scheme E is called homomorphic on C if it is correct on C and
the decryption algorithm can be expressed as a circuit of size poly(n) [27]. The scheme is
called fully homomorphic if C is the set of arbitrary circuits. Because a Boolean circuit can
describe arbitrary computations, a scheme only needs to be homomorphic over addition and
multiplication to be described as fully homomorphic [50]. A scheme E is called additively
homomorphic if
EncryptE (x + y) = EncryptE (x) ⊕ EncryptE (y)
for some operation ⊕ in the ciphertext space. Similarly, a scheme is called multiplicatively
homomorphic if
EncryptE (x · y) = EncryptE (x) ⊗ EncryptE (y)
for an operation ⊗ in the ciphertext space. This functionality is shown in Figure 2.4. Two
plaintexts that are first encrypted, added (or multiplied), and then decrypted, yield the same
result as adding (or multiplying) over the original plaintexts.
While computation of arbitrary functions is theoretically possible using addition and
multiplication as described above, this in itself is not sufficient for practical computation of
arbitrary functions. Any fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is suited for practical
use will only be able to compute polynomial functions and polynomial approximations of
functions, known as polynomial machine learning [35].

2.4.1

Private-Key Fully Homomorphic Encryption

The majority of previous work focuses on public-key fully homomorphic encryption. This
work implements private-key fully homomorphic encryption. A private-key cryptosystem
generates only one key, the secret key, during the KeyGen algorithm. This private key is used
for both encryption of plaintexts and decryption of ciphertexts.
A private key homomorphic encryption scheme E over a set of circuits C is defined via
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Figure 2.4: Homomorphic addition (top) and multiplication (bottom)
the following algorithms:
I. sk = KeyGenE (n), the key generation algorithm, which distributes a private key sk to
the necessary party given some security parameter n.
II. c = EncryptE (m, sk), the encryption algorithm, which takes as input sk as well as a
message m. The output is a ciphertext c.
III. m = DecryptE (c, sk), the decryption algorithm, which uses the private key sk to recover
the plaintext m given a ciphertext c.
IV. c = EvaluateE (c1 , c2 , . . . , cn , C), an algorithm to perform computation over encrypted
data. The input to this function is a collection of ciphertexts c1 , c2 , . . . , ct and a circuit
C ∈ C.
Encryption and decryption can only be carried out by keyholder(s), while evaluation can
be performed by any party possessing a ciphertext. As before, a private-key homomorphic
encryption scheme is called fully homomorphic if C is the set of arbitrary circuits, and
arbitrary computation can be reduced via Boolean circuits to homomorphic addition and
multiplication.
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Leveled, Somewhat, and Partially Homomorphic Encryption

A scheme that is homomorphic over one operation is called partially homomorphic. A partially homomorphic scheme can be additively homomorphic or multiplicatively homomorphic. Partially homomorphic encryption schemes have existed for some time, such as the
multiplicatively homomorphic ElGamal scheme [23] and the additively homomorphic Pallier
scheme [48].
Schemes that can perform homomorphic addition and multiplication over encrypted
data up to some computational limit are called somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE)
schemes. These schemes contain noise terms, which grow exponentially during homomorphic addition and multiplication operations, and correct decryption is not possible once
these noise terms exceed a noise bound. The first FHE schemes were constructed from SHE
schemes using a technique called bootstrapping, which manages this noise, discussed in detail
in Chapter 3.
A leveled homomorphic encryption (LHE) scheme is a scheme in which noise growth is
polynomial in the homomorphic multiplication operation. Therefore, these schemes can be
implemented to perform FHE up to some pre-specified depth without bootstrapping. Specific
LHE schemes are discussed in Chapter 3.

2.4.3

Notation

For the remainder of this work let JxKS denote the encryption of a plaintext x within an
encryption scheme S. For brevity of notation, the subscript is omitted for values encrypted
under the Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) scheme. The fully homomorphic addition and
multiplication operations are denoted by JxK + JyK = Jx ⊕ yK and JxK · JyK = Jx ⊗ yK,
$

respectively. Let a ←
− A denote the selection of a value a from a set a uniformly at random.

Chapter 3
Background
This chapter provides an overview of current methods in the field of privacy-preserving
classification, machine learning, and computational medicine. These methods include differential privacy, fully homomorphic encryption, and various non-fully homomorphic encryption
methods.
Leveled homomorphic encryption schemes have found some success with classification
algorithms. The Yet Another Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption scheme (YASHE) was
used in an application of neural networks to encrypted data called CryptoNets [33], and has
been implemented in the Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL) as well with bioinformatics computation in mind [21]. ML Confidential used leveled homomorphic encryption
(LHE) to run classification using Linear Means and Fisher’s Linear Discriminant classifiers
[35].
Some private classification methods do not implement homomorphic encryption. Differential privacy is one non-cryptographic approach that has been implemented, although it
lacks the utility of FHE schemes [33]. Non-fully homomorphic cryptographic methods have
been used to apply Naive Bayes and decision tree classification [5]. Vaidya et al. describe
protocols for constructing support vector machine (SVM) models using horizontally, ver15
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tically, or arbitrarily partitioned data while maintaining the privacy of their data without
FHE [63].
This chapter begins with discussion of differential privacy and privacy-preserving classification techniques. The chapter concludes with an overview of the history of public-key and
private-key fully homomorphic encryption methods as well as the current techniques.

3.1

Differential Privacy

Differential privacy is a non-cryptographic approach to private data mining that has seen
some success with training various classification algorithms [22]. Differential privacy is a
method of security that applies to databases. Intuitively, if there are two databases that
differ on only one row, a query satisfies differential privacy if there is a very high probability
that the query will produce the same result regardless of which database is queried. This
method’s security depends upon having a large database. This method loses its utility when
the goal is to classify a single data point [33].
One example of differential privacy for data analysis is given by Wang, Mohammed, and
Chen, who present a method for distributing genetic data that satisfies differential privacy
[66]. The authors provide the following formal definition of differential privacy.
Definition 3.1.1. Let A be a randomized algorithm and let D and D0 be two databases such
that
|D∆D0 | ≤ 1.
In other words, there is at most one row in D0 that does not appear in D, or vice versa. Say
that A is -differentially private if for all possible anonymized data sets D̂,
Pr[A(D) = D̂] ≤ re × Pr[A(D0 ) = D̂].
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In sum, one effectively cannot tell from looking at the output of A on D and on D0
whether or not one specific line of data was included in the data set. This is often achieved
by adding in random noise. The results of a query are disguised by giving an answer that is
not quite exact, but is “close enough" for the intended analyses.
The goal of differential privacy, while similar to that of encryption, is different in key
ways. The goal of encrypting information is to hide it completely. With differential privacy,
the goal is not to hide data but rather to anonymize it. Furthermore, in the setting explored
in this work, the goal is to hide not only the database from the user, but also to hide the query
from the database holder. Differential privacy only seeks to perform the former function.

3.2
3.2.1

Privacy-preserving Classification
ML Confidential

Graepel, Lauter, and Naehrig suggest a framework for private training and classfication
via machine learning that they title ML Confidential [35]. This protocol is proposed for
both the training and classification phases of machine learning and is carried out entirely
over encrypted data using an LHE or SHE scheme. The authors describe a protocol that
operates over a class of machine learning algorithms that they designate polynomial learning.
A proof-of-concept is given for the classification phase of machine learning.
ML Confidential operates between three parties. There is the Data Owner, who holds
the data to be processed, as well as the Content Provider, which uploads data to the Cloud
Service Provider on the Data Owner’s behalf. The Data Owner wishes to perform both the
training phase, ML.Train, and classification phase, ML.Classify, of some machine learning
algorithm on the cloud without giving the cloud access to their data. The protocol may be
either private key or public key. Furthermore, the homomorphic encryption scheme used may
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be either fully homomorphic, somewhat homomorphic, or a leveled homomorphic encryption
scheme. The algorithms provided by the protocol are
• HE.Keygen for generation of (public or private) keys,
• HE.Enc for (somewhat/leveled/fully) homomorphic encryption,
• HE.Dec, the corresponding decryption algorithm,
• HE.Eval for homomorphic computation and utilizes HE.Add for homomorphic addition
and HE.Mult for homomorphic multiplication.
Note that the specifics regarding the functionality of these functions depend upon whether
the scheme is private or public key as well as the method of homomorphic encryption utilized.
In particular, the authors provide examples of a leveled homomorphic encryption scheme in
which HE.Eval computes polynomial functions of a bounded degree.
ML Confidential Protocol, Private Key Version
• Key Generation: The Data Owner runs HE.Keygen to generate a private key sk, securely stored locally, and shares this key with the Content Provider.
• Encryption & Upload, Training Data: For all training vectors x the Content Provider
sends HE.Enc(sk, x) to the Cloud Service Provider.
• Training: The algorithm HE.Eval runs the training phase ML.Train on the encrypted
training vectors. This computes an encrypted Learned Model that is stored by the
Cloud and available to the Data Owner.
• Classification: Next, a previously unused vector x is encrypted and HE.Enc(sk, x) is
sent to the cloud, which carries out ML.Classify and returns the encrypted classification to the data owner.
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• Verification: The Data Owner tests the encrypted Learned Model probabilistically by
sending encryptions of test vectors to the Cloud and verifying that they are returned
with the correct classifications.
For the public key version, only the first algorithm is significantly modified:

ML Confidential Protocol, Public Key Version
• Key Generation: The Data Owner runs HE.Keygen to generate a private key sk securely
stored locally and a public key pk. It publishes the public key pk.
The algorithm HE.Encrypt uses the public key, pk, while HE.Decrypt can only be carried
out by the Data Owner using the secret key, sk.
This protocol allows a diverse range of sources to provide data while all computation
takes place on the cloud. Its security model is designed for a cloud that is honest-butcurious, meaning it will look at the available data but will not deviate from the set protocol.
The authors point out this is a reasonable assumption for any commercial cloud service, as
once the Cloud’s reputation is damaged it will not be able to acquire new clients and hence
it has strong motivation to behave honestly. The authors describe their verification step as
a naive version of Proof-of-Storage protocols. The Data Owner must store and test enough
samples to either determine the test error of the Cloud or determine the location of any
accidental error, but has no reason to suspect that the Cloud is purposefully manipulating
their data in any way.
Furthermore, the Cloud gains access to a certain amount of information during this
protocol. The Cloud must learn the number of vectors trained upon, the number of vectors
tested, the number of vectors in each class, and an upper bound on the number of entries in
each class.
Next, the authors define a polynomial learning algorithm as follows:
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Definition 3.2.1. Let A : (Rn × Y)m × Rn → Y be a learning algorithm that takes a training
sample (R × Y)m and a test input x ∈ Rn and returns a prediction y ∈ Y. Call the learning
algorithm D-polynomial if the function A is polynomial of degree at most D in all of its
arguments.
The authors describe a leveled homomorphic encryption scheme based off of the BrakerskiGentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme [11], discussed in detail in Section 3.5.2. Its security
is based in the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem, which provides strong hardness
guarantees [46]. The scheme involves a noise term that grows during homomorphic operations. This scheme can only compute D-polynomial functions. Any other function results in
noise growth that obstructs decryption.
This scheme was used to perform binary classification with inputs in Rn . The authors
test linearizations of the linear means classifier and Fisher’s linear discriminant classifier on
publicly available breast cancer data using a public-key SHE scheme based on ring-LWE.
Because the cryptosystem described is unable to perform any computations that are not
D-polynomial this method is unable to perform many of the common machine learning algorithms, including perceptron, support vector machine, k-nearest neighbors, decision trees,
exact logistic regression, and more.

3.2.2

The Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL)

The Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL) was developed by researchers in the
Cryptography Research Group at Microsoft Research [21]. It is a homomorphic encryption
library that was made specifically with Bioinformatics research in mind. SEAL uses LHE
with parameters chosen to perform a predetermined number of computations. Initial implementations of SEAL used a variant on the YASHE scheme described in [5]. The most
recent version [43] implements the “FullRNS” variant [4] of the Fan-Vercauteren somewhat
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homomorphic scheme [25].

The authors describe methods in which their software can be used for various biomedical
applications. Possible applications mentioned are computing minor allele frequencies, χ2 statistics, and tests for association of a genotype with disease, among others.
Because of the nature of leveled homomorphic encryption, it can reduce the cost of computation to compute an approximation in place of a more costly function. An example
provided by the authors is that of logistic regression. The authors approximate the logistic
regression function using polynomial approximations, and hence are able to use this approximation with SEAL.

3.2.3

SEAL for Classification via Neural Networks

Dowlin et al. provide a methodology they term CryptoNets in order to carry out private
classification over neural networks. They use the YASHE leveled homomorphic encryption
scheme to implement their protocol [5], implemented via SEAL [21].
A neural network consists of layers containing nodes that compute functions over values
fed from the previous layer. These functions are often not polynomial functions, making the
direct application of homomorphic encryption unfeasible. Therefore, the authors describe a
class of polynomial functions that can be implemented at each layer during the classification
stage instead.
Specifically, the authors include the sigmoid function in their network, which computes

z 7→

1
1 + exp(−z)

for a value z from a node in the previous layer. The sigmoid function is used in the final
layer of the authors’ training network. During the testing stage, this step was removed from
the network altogether, as it is a monotone function and hence does not affect the final
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prediction once training is complete. The authors replace the more commonly used rectified
linear activation function z 7→ max{0, z} with the square activation function z 7→ z 2 in both
the training and testing stage.
Max pooling is another common layer seen in neural networks that computes the average
value of a subset of components from the previous layer. The authors replace the max
pooling layer in the classification stage with a polynomial approximation by simply taking
the sum of the components instead of the average. As a result, the output in this layer is
scaled by some factor and this scaling propagates to subsequent layers. The authors use this
scaled mean-pool function in their network in both the training and testing stages instead of
max pooling layers.
The authors train a sample network on images of 60, 000 handwritten digits then test on
the 10, 000 remaining images. They achieve an accuracy rate of 99%.

3.2.4

Other Cryptographic Methods

Bost et. al. construct protocols for privacy-preserving classification using hyperplane detection, Naive Bayes, and decision trees [6]. The protocols are constructed using two additively
homomorphic encryption schemes and one leveled homomorphic encryption scheme, HElib
[59]. The additively homomorphic schemes are Goldwasser and Micali’s Quadratic Reciprocity (QR) cryptosystem [34], as well as the Paillier cryptosystem [48]. Let pkQ , skQ
denote a public and secret key pair in the QR cryptosystem and pkP , skP denote the same
in Paillier’s system. Let square brackets JaKP and JaKQR denote the encryption of a value a
under Paillier and QR, respectively. The security of these cryptosystems provides semantic
security for the authors’ protocols, and an honest-but-curious adversary model is used.
This subsection discusses the privacy-preserving Naive Bayes protocol presented by the
authors. In order to build their privacy-preserving classification protocol, the authors first
describe efficient protocols to perform comparison and argmax operations over encrypted
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data. They compose these operations within their schemes to construct their encrypted
machine learning protocols.
The protocols for comparison and argmax are designed by the authors to work for additively homomorphic public-key cryptosystems and do not apply directly to this paper.
Therefore, this section discusses the authors’ private Naive Bayes algorithm in full, and
reserves discussion of comparison and argmax for Chapter 5.

Comparison
Consider two data holders, A and B, who wish to compare their data, as well as the classifiers,
a client C and server S. The authors describe several separate cases in that a comparison
protocol can be carried out.
In the first scenario, A and B wish to privately compare their values a and b, respectively.
The user B randomly selects a masking bit c and its sends its encryption under QR, JcKQR ,
to A. The authors construct a scheme that uses a garbled circuit combined with oblivious
transfer to allow A to compute (a < b) ⊕ c. Because A also knows the value JcKQR , A can
use the additively homomorphic property of QR to compute Ja < bKQR .
The next cases discussed by the authors involve comparison on encrypted inputs. User
A has two encrypted inputs JaK and JbK that she would like to compare and user B has the
decryption key. The users construct a method using a modification on the protocol designed
by Veugen [64]. The last case of comparison the authors consider again has user A with two
encrypted inputs. This one proceeds as the last case, but reversed – thus B is left with the
result of the comparison while A is the one who holds the (encrypted) data.

argmax
The authors consider private computation of the argmax function, which returns the argument (position) of the maximum value in a vector. User A has access to values Ja1 K, . . . , Jak K,
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encrypted under user B’s secret key. A wants B to learn the index of the largest of the k
values without learning any other information, including other information on the ordering
of the values.
User A begins by randomizing the order of the k elements using a random permutation π
and sets the maximum index value equal to aπ(1) . The idea is to iterate through each value
in the permutation, comparing Jaπ(1) K to Jaπ(2) K and setting the maximum value equal to the
index of whichever is larger. Note that this is, in fact, a sequence of k comparisons.
The authors begin each comparison by running the previously described privacy-preserving
comparison protocol. This alone is not sufficient for the privacy goal because user A will
learn the ordering of the permuted inputs. Therefore, B must implement another randomization step, which the authors call Refresh. The Refresh procedure is carried out by the
Paillier system’s method for randomization of ciphertexts.
This is still not sufficient, because user B holds the secret key for the Paillier system.
Therefore, instead of B performing Refresh on Jaπ(i) K, the authors use the additive homo-

morphic property of the Paillier scheme. User A sends B the value Ja0i K, which is Jaπ(i) K
perturbed by A adding random noise. User B then performs the Refresh procedure on Ja0i K.
Private Naive Bayes
The authors implement the above protocols to carry out private Naive Bayes classification.
Let G denote the set of classes and assume there is a finite number of values each attribute
can take. Let P denote the vector of class probabilities, where Pi = Pr(Gi ), and let T denote
the collection of tables given by Ti,j (X) = Pr(X = Xi |G = Gi ). Assume each vector X has
d features, and that there are c possible classes. The authors’ private Naive Bayes protocol
runs as follows.
1:

The service provider encrypts the tables P and T using Paillier.

2:

The server sends the encrypted tables to the client.
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3:
4:
5:

The client computes Jpi K = JPi K

Qd

j=1 JTi,j (xj )K

for i = 1, . . . , c.

The client uses the server to compute i = argmaxi pi .
Client outputs i.

Note that step three of the above protocol requires only that the encryption scheme be
multiplicatively homomorphic. It is Step 4 that would ultimately require an additively
homomorphic scheme. The authors in [6] use multiple encryption methods, combined with
an algorithm for changing the encryption scheme, in order to compute the argmax.

Private Polynomial Decision Tree
The authors describe a protocol by which a user can classify her data point using a binary
decision tree without giving away any information about her data, while also not learning
any information about the path her data point took on the tree. To achieve this, the authors
use the polynomial representation of the decision tree as their learned model and describe
an algorithm, which uses both the QR scheme and a public-key FHE scheme, to classify a
data point based on this representation. Specifically, the authors used the FHE scheme in
HElib [59] to run their protocol.

3.3

Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes

The study of fully homomorphic encryption schemes has proceeded in three phrases described
by Peikert in A Decade of Lattice Cryptography as follows [50]. The first phase consisted
of the first publications of groundbreaking, yet impractical, FHE schemes beginning with
Gentry’s seminal thesis [27]. From there, the second wave of FHE began with a rapid series
of efficiency improvements including bootstrapping and the development of SHE and LHE
schemes. The third generation of FHE began around 2013, where practical improvements
simplified and raised the efficiency of FHE schemes [2, 9, 32]. The following sections provide
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an overview of the major breakthroughs throughout these three waves as well as security
assumptions underlying the schemes.

3.4

The First FHE Schemes

Gentry’s thesis described the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme [27]. While Gentry’s
seminal work was not a practical scheme in terms of applications, it laid the foundations
for a wealth of future work in public-key FHE. Subsequent works follow his method of first
constructing a SHE scheme then bootstrapping this scheme into a FHE scheme.
Improvements on this original framework occurred rapidly in the years following this first
publication. While improvements upon Gentry’s initial scheme provide some schemes that
are conceptually simpler, one common thread among public-key FHE schemes is the the time
and difficulty it takes to describe them. Therefore, this chapter provides an overview of the
concepts of these public-key FHE schemes and leave the details to the referenced papers.
Gentry’s first FHE scheme is built around a mathematical construct called a lattice. A
lattice L is a discrete subgroup of Rn [50]. More specifically, let L be a subset of Rn , and
let 0 denote the zero vector in Rn . Say that L is a subgroup of Rn if 0 ∈ L, and −x ∈ L
and x + y ∈ L for every x, y ∈ L. This subgroup is called discrete if for every element x ∈ L
there exists some neighborhood Nx ⊂ Rn such that L ∩ Nx = {x}. For instance, the integers
Zn form a discrete subgroup of Rn , hence Zn forms an n-lattice known as the integer lattice.

3.4.1

Gentry’s Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Gentry’s seminal work proceeded in three main steps. First, a somewhat homomorphic
encryption scheme was constructed that is able to compute only a limited class of functions
homomorphically. From here, a bootstrapping method was developed in order to enable
arbitrary computation based on the limited class of functions in the previous step. Finally,
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bootstrapping is applied to the somewhat homomorpic encryption scheme in order to make
it fully homomorphic by “squash(ing) the decryption circuits” [27].
What follows is an overview of Gentry’s original scheme, which omits some of the finer
details and proofs. Gentry’s concept of a “bootstrapping” is described first, followed by an
overview of his original somewhat homomorphic scheme and the bootstrapping procedure
applied to it.
Consider a ring R = Z[x]/f (x) for monic degree n polynomials f (x) ∈ Z[x]. This means
f (x) is of the form
f (x) = xn + an−1 xn−1 + · · · + a1 x + a0
with coefficients ai ∈ Z. Gentry describes that elements v ∈ R can be thought of as
(coefficient) vectors v ∈ Zn , and the ideal generated by v yields the ideal lattice (v) generated
by
{v × xi

mod f (x) : i ∈ [0, n − 1]}.

Let I denote an ideal of R and BI a basis of I. The KeyGen algorithm runs a sub-algorithm


sk
Bpk
= IdealGen(R, BI )
J , BJ



sk
where Bpk
J and BJ are bases of an ideal J such that I + J = R.

Furthermore, let Samp(x, BI , R, BJ ) represent an algorithm that takes samples from x+I.
Gentry shows that this coset has a unique representative with respect to BI that can be
computed efficiently, meaning the value x mod BI is unique. This holds for any x ∈ R and
any ideal of R.
With this in mind, the encryption scheme E 0 runs as follows, where R = Z[x]/f (x) and
ideal correspond to lattices as above.
sk
I. (pk, sk) = KeyGenE 0 (R, BI ), where pk = (R, BI , Bpk
J , Samp) and sk = (pk, BJ ).
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II. c = EncryptE 0 (pk, m), the encryption algorithm. This algorithm encrypts a plaintext
m by computing
c0 = Samp(m, BI , R, Bsk
J )
and returning c = c0 mod Bpk
J .
III. m = Decryptsk,c , the decryption algorithm, which computes
m = (c mod Bsk
J )

mod BI

and returning m.
IV. c = EvaluateE 0 (pk, C, c1 , c2 ) for a circuit C and ciphertexts c1 and c2 . This algorithm
evaluates C over c1 and c2 using sub-algorithms
Add(pk, c1 , c2 ) = c1 + c2
Mult(pk, c1 , c2 ) = c1 × c2

mod Bpk
j
mod Bpk
j

The class of circuits CE 0 that can be computed are also described by Gentry. Let XEnc
and XDec be subsets of Zn , where XEnc is the set of all samples from the coset x + I and
XDec = R mod BJ sk . Let B(r) denote the ball of radius r in R. Then, there are values

rEnc = min{r : XEnc ⊂ B(r)}
rDec = max{r : XDec ⊃ B(r)}
and permitted circuits are ones where an input in B(rEnc )t yields an output in B(rDec ).
Gentry shows that this constitutes the set of circuits with depth at most

log log rDec − log log nMult(R) · rEnc
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for some constant factor nMult(R) where ku × vk ≤ nMult(R) · kuk · kvk.
Gentry concludes by showing that increasing the depth of the circuits that can be homomorphically evaluated requires minimizing nMult(R) and rEnc and maximizing rDec .
A series of complex bootstrapping operations is carried out by Gentry in order to bring
the scheme above scheme up to a FHE scheme. Broadly, he lowers the complexity of the
decryption circuit of E 0 by reducing the size of rDec and alters the decryption algorithm to
run simplified computations. Furthermore, he reduces the work the decryption algorithm
must carry out by adding in preprocessing steps to the encryption algorithm that reduce the
amount of work that must be performed during decryption.
This original scheme is impractical in multiple ways. First of all, it is conceptually
dense and requires a large breadth of knowledge of advanced mathematics to understand.
Beyond this, and more importantly, the computation time required to implement the fully
homomorphic properties of this scheme is highly impractical.

3.5

Second-Generation FHE and Beyond

A number of papers were published in the years immediately following Gentry’s original
publication. Van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and Vaikuntanathan published a scheme in 2010 that
avoided the average-case assumptions of lattice-based cryptography and instead was based
simply on modular arithmetic [20]. As above, they started with a somewhat homomorphic
scheme and applied bootstrapping to achieve a fully homomorphic scheme. The security of
this scheme was based on the hardness of the approximate-GCD problem, where you must
find an integer p given a set of randomly chosen integers that lie “close” to some multiple of
p. Further work based on the approximate-GCD problem was carried out by Coron et al.,
who reduced the public key size of the scheme of Van Dijk et al. [17].
In another paper, Smart and Vercauteren describe a somewhat homomorphic encryption
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scheme, which supports SIMD (Single-Instruction Multiple-Data) operations, thus enabling
a level of parallelization in FHE [60]. As before, bootstrapping methods were used to raise
this scheme from SHE to FHE. Their scheme is lattice-based, the security of the scheme is
based on a variant of the Bounded Distance Decoding Problem (BDDP), and the security of
their bootstrapping procedure is based on the Sparse Subset Sum Problem (SSSP). BDDP
seeks to find the closest lattice vector to a given vector (not necessarily in the lattice), and
SSSP seeks to find a sparse subset of a larger set A whose sum is equal to a given number s
modulo a given N .
A number of other papers contribute to this “second generation” of public-key FHE
that follow Gentry’s SHE-bootstrap-FHE blueprint [7, 9, 8, 10, 17, 28, 60]. A series of
papers Zvika Brakerski and Vinod Vaikuntanathan published in 2011, “Fully Homomorphic
Encryption from ring-LWE and Security for Key Dependent Messages” [9] and “Efficient
Fully Homomorphic Encryption from (Standard) LWE” [8], were of particular impact. These
papers use the SSSP as well as LWE and ring-LWE. The results in these papers were improved
in a joint work with Gentry [11]. This paper, “Fully Homomorphic Encryption Without
Bootstrapping,” removed the need for expensive bootstrapping procedures entirely. Although
bootstrapping is available as an optimization procedure in this scheme, it is not necessary
to implement it to achieve FHE.

3.5.1

The Learning With Errors Problem

A major shift seen in this second generation of schemes is the use of the learning with errors
(LWE) and ring-learning with errors (ring-LWE) problems as cryptographic foundations.
The LWE problem was introduced by Regev [56] and is seen as ideal for cryptographic
applications as its average-case hardness is as hard as the worst-case, up to a polynomial
factor. Learning with errors asks us to find a vector s ∈ Znq given m samples (ai , bi ) ∈ Znq ×Zq ,
where ai is uniformly random in Znq , e is an error term taken from some error distribution,
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and
(ai , b) = hs, ai i + e

(mod q).

Abstractly, the goal is to recover the vector s when given some set of approximate linear
equations over s. The fact that these equations are approximate rather than exact is what
leads to the presumed hardness of this problem. Furthermore, LWE is as hard in the average
case as it is in the worst case, albeit up to a polynomial factor, an ideal situation for
cryptography.
Ring-LWE is a ring-based variant on LWE introduced in [46]. Ring-LWE takes m samples
(ai , bi ) from Rq × Rq for a ring R of degree n over Z, where Rq = R/qR. Again, there is
an error term e taken from an error distribution χ over R (typically an embedded discrete
Gaussian). The ring-LWE problem asks us to distinguish whether the given m samples were
taken from the uniform distribution or from the ring-LWE distribution containing samples
of the form
(a, b) = s · a + e

(mod q)

for an unknown term s ∈ Rq . The ring-LWE problem was shown to be at least as hard as
quantumly solving the shortest vector problem (SVP) [46]. SVP is a hard problem based
on ideal lattices, which has a best known solution taking exponential time in the quantum
setting [50].
Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan define a further problem, the general learning
with errors problem (GLWE), as a generalized and combined version of LWE and ring-LWE.
In this construction, the ring is given by R = Z[x]/(xd + 1) where d is a power of 2. LWE is
considered as a sub-case of ring-LWE, which occurs when d = 1.
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3.5.2

The Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) Scheme

The Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme is a ring-based scheme based on the
assumption of the infeasibility of the GLWE problem [11]. It uses either the ring R = Z or
R = Z[x]/(xd + 1), where d is a power of 2, as a platform. The BGV scheme proved to be a
major step forward from Gentry’s original scheme. It provided a reduction in noise growth
via a technique called modulus-switching, smaller key sizes, and the introduction of SIMD
parallelization to FHE.
This section provides an overview of the algorithms in the authors’ basic scheme in the
ring-LWE case, leaving out some of the more technical mathematical details.
I. (params, pk, sk) = KeyGen(1λ , 2L ), the key generation algorithm over some security parameters λ and L. This key generation algorithm contains two sub-algorithms called
({params}) = Setup(1λ , 1L ) and (sk, pk) = KeyGen({params}). Defining these algorithms in detail is very technical, and details on parameter and key construction can be
found in the original paper [11]. It suffices to note that the private key consists of L vectors s1 , . . . , sL ∈ Rqn+1 and the public key consists L matrices A1 , . . . , AL ∈ RqN ×(n+1) .
II. c = Encrypt(params, pk, m), the encryption algorithm, which takes as input the security parameters, public key pk, and a message m ∈ Rqn+1 . To encrypt, take a random
sample r ← R2N . The ciphertext c ∈ Rqn+1 is given by
c = (m, 0, . . . , 0) + ATj r.

for some j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ L.
III. m = Decrypt(params, sk, c), the decryption algorithm, which outputs

m = [[hc, sj i]q ]2 .
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assuming c is encrypted under public key Aj . Note that the above notation represents
modular reduction in (−q/2, q/2] followed by reduction modulo 2.
IV. c4 = Add(pk, c1 , c2 ), the homomorphic addition algorithm, which takes as input the
public keys along with two ciphertexts encrypted under the same secret key sj . Note
that the Refresh algorithm below will allow us to perform key switching for ciphertexts
not encrypted under the same sj . Compute homomorphic addition:

c3 = c1 + c2

(mod qj )

where qj ∈ params. The ciphertext c3 is associated with the private key s0j = sj ⊗ sj ,
the tensor of sj with itself. Output c4 = Refresh(c3 , params).
V. c4 = Mult(pk, c1 , c2 ), the homomorphic multiplication operation, which again takes
as input ciphertexts encrypted under the same decryption key sj . Compute c3 as the
coefficients of the linear equation given by

hc1 , xi · hc2 , xi.
Output c4 = Refresh(c3 , params).
VI. Refresh(c, params), an algorithm to perform key switching. The details of this algorithm are left for [11]; the procedure involves a modulus switching procedure and a key
switching procedure to change a ciphertext from being encrypted under s0j to encryption
under sj−1 with modulus qj−1 .
The Refresh procedure must be carried out during multiplication in order to perform
noise reduction. The noise added during addition is always negligible enough for this procedure to be unnecessary. Observe furthermore that bootstrapping is not required in order
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for this scheme to be fully homomorphic. A bootstrapping procedure is provided by the
authors, however, in order to increase efficiency in terms of performance.

3.5.3

HElib

Shai Halevi, a researcher at IBM, wrote a software library called HElib, which implements
a version of the BGV scheme in C++, and is publicly available on GitHub [59]. HElib
implements a number of optimizations on the BGV scheme in order to decrease runtime
of algorithms [38]. Specifically, HElib uses what is called the single instruction multiple
data (SIMD) paradigm to perform parallel computations and increase runtimes. HElib also
implements optimizations published by Gentry, Halevi, and Smart [30, 29, 31] as well as
ciphertext packing techniques published by Smart and Vercauteren [60].

3.5.4

Yet Another Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
(YASHE)

Another popular somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme introduced around this time
was YASHE, or “yet another somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme” [5]. While the
scheme still requires key-switching methods, this does not utilize any modulus-switching
methods such as seen in the BGV scheme; the authors call this property scale-invariance.
Furthermore, YASHE uses a smaller ciphertext size than BGV as ciphertexts are given by
just one ring element (as opposed to multiple ring elements in BGV). YASHE is secure under
the ring-LWE assumption.
An overview of the scheme is provided. The ring R is given by R = Z[x]/(Φd (x)),
where Φd (x) is the dth cyclotomic polynomial. The dth cyclotomic polynomial is the unique
irreducible polynomial in Z[x] that divides xd − 1 but does not divide x` − 1 for any ` < d,
and is of degree n = ϕ(d), where ϕ denotes Euler’s totient function. Also assume there is
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some error distribution χ as well as a parameters q and t, 1 < t < q.

I. (pk, sk, evf) = KeyGen(λ), the key generation algorithm over some security parameter
λ. Run a sub-algorithm to generate the parameters d, q, g, and distributions χ, and χ0 .
Given samples f 0 , g ← χ0 , set f = [tf 0 + 1]q and verify that f is invertible modulo q. (If
not, repeat.) The private key is f and the public key is given by h, where h = [tgf −1 ]q .
A further evaluation key γ is computed for use in the KeySwitch algorithm. Output
(pk, sk, evf) = (f, h, γ).
II. c = Encrypt(pk, m), which encrypts a message m as a ciphertext c ∈ R. Let [m]t be a
representative of m + tR and let s, e ← χ. Output c = [bq/tc[m]t + e + hs]q .
III. m = Decrypt(sk, c), which outputs
"$

m=

t
· [f c]q
q

%#

.
t

IV. c3 = Add(c1 , c2 ), which computes addition as

c3 = [c1 + c2 ]q .

V. c3 = Mult(c1 , c2 , evk), which computes multiplication as
"$

c̃ =

t
c1 c2
q

'#

.
q

for a function P which embeds c1 ∈ R in R` for a parameter `. The value c̃ is an
encryption under f 2 . The output is given by c3 = KeySwitch(c̃, evk), which transforms
the ciphertext c̃ into a ciphertext c3 that is can be decrypted under the original key
secret key, f .
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This leveled fully homomorphic scheme is brought up to a fully homomorphic scheme via
bootstrapping procedures as described by Gentry in his original publication [26]. As with
the other public-key FHE schemes, homomorphic computation in YASHE results in noise
that grows with each computation and imposes a limit on the number of computations that
may be carried out before the noise grows too large.

3.5.5

Fan-Vercauteren (FV) Encryption

Fan and Vercauteren introduced a scheme, commonly referred to as the FV scheme [25]. This
scheme is a version of Brakerski’s scheme [7], which is based off of the ring-LWE problem
rather than LWE. The bootstrapping procedure introduced by the authors used modulus
switching in order to create a simpler method.
In this scheme the plaintext ring is given by Rt = Zt [x]/(ϕ(x)) for an integer t > 1 and
monic, irreducible polynomial ϕ ∈ Z[x] of degree d. Let R denote the ring Z[x]/(ϕ(x)).
I. (pk, sk) = KeyGen(λ), the key generation algorithm with security parameters λ. Let χ
be a distribution on Z[x]/(ϕ(x)), described by the authors. The public key pk is given
by
(f0 , f1 ) = ([−(a · g + e)]q , a),
where a ← Rq , e, g ← χ, and [x]q denotes reduction of all coefficients of x ∈ R modulo
q. Output (pk, sk) = ((f0 , f1 ), g).
II. c = (c0 , c1 ) = Encrypt(pk, m), which encrypts a message m ∈ Rt as the ciphertext
c ∈ Rq2 given by



(c0 , c1 ) =

where u, e1 , e2 ← χ.

q
· m , [f1 · u + e2 ]q
f0 · u + e1 +
t
q
 



!
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III. m = Decrypt(sk, c), which decrypts by computing
"$

m=

t · [c0 + c1 · s]q
q

'#
t

where s = sk is the secret key.
IV. e = Add(c, d) adds ciphertexts c = (c0 , c1 ) and d = (d0 , d1 ) to obtain the ciphertext
e = (e0 , e1 ) via the operation

(e0 , e1 ) = ([c0 + d0 ]q , [c1 + d1 ]q ) .

V. e = Mult(c, d) multiplies ciphertexts c = (c0 , c1 ) and d = (d0 , d1 ) to obtain the ciphertext e = (e0 , e1 ). First, compute
"$

ē0 =
"$

ē1 =
"$

ē2 =

t · (c0 · d0 )
q

'#
q

t · (c0 · d0 + c1 · d1 )
q
t · (c1 · d1 )
q

'#
q

'#
q

Next, there are two variants on the final computation of multiplication, details of which
are highly technical and left to the original paper [25]. The first method minimizes error
due to noise accumulation, while the second method is similar to modulus-switching
methods and reduces the time and space used during computation.
This leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme is brought up to a FHE scheme via
bootstrapping procedures.
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3.5.6

Third-Generation Public-Key FHE: Recent Developments

Around late 2012 or early 2013 marked the switchover to what Peikert terms the third
generation of FHE, marked by a shift in the internal methods used within the schemes
[50]. Gentry, Sahai, and Waters published a FHE scheme in 2013 based on LWE that
introduced the approximate eigenvector method for multiplication [32]. This method reduces
homomorphic multiplication in most cases to matrix multiplication, a much more efficient
procedure. Gentry, Halevi, and Smart revisited bootstrapping procedures to reduce the
computational bottleneck involved in these algorithms [30].

3.6

Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) Encryption

Alexey Gribov, Delaram Kahrobaei, and Vladimir Shpilrain presented a novel approach to
fully homomorphic encryption called the Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) cryptosystem
[36]. This ring-based scheme is able to avoid much of the computational overhead required
for fully homomorphic public key encryption. The authors define the platform ring Sn as
Sn = hx1 , x2 , . . . , xn |p · 1 = 0, x2i = xi , and xi xj = xj xi for all i, ji.

(3.1)

This ring contains a super-exponential number of idempotent elements, or elements g ∈ Sn
such that g 2 = g. Some idempotent elements are given by

eF :=

Y
i∈F

xi ·

Y
j6∈F

(1 − xj )

for any set of indexes F ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}). The above construction yields 2n idempotent
elements that are pairwise orthogonal, meaning eF eG = 0 whenever F 6= G, and represent a
linear basis of Sn over Zp .
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The scheme is ring-based and involves a private plaintext ring P and a ciphertext ring
C, where P is a retract of C, i.e., P ⊂ C and at the same time P is a factor ring of C. Both
P and C are rings of the form of Equation 3.1. Let I be an ideal of C such that C/I is
isomorphic to P .
The data owner, D, generates C and I during the key generation algorithm. Parameters
n, r, and p are chosen such that p is a large prime, r > n, and let P := Sn . The ciphertext
ring C = Sr is randomly generated from P = Sn as {xi }si=1 , where s > n. In other words,
the ring C = Sr expands upon the generators of P = Sn . The data owner then randomly
chooses an ideal I by randomly selecting elements

xm − wm (x1 , x2 , . . . , xm−1 )
for m = n + 1, . . . , r, where wm (x1 , x2 , . . . , xm−1 ) represents an idempotent element of Sm−1 .
Observe that C/I is isomorphic to P by construction. The data owner next rewrites C in
terms of its orthogonal basis {ei }2i=1 and applies a random permutation π to the orthogonal
r

set generators. D concludes the key generation algorithm with a final transformation between
this permuted basis, given by
C = he1 , e2 , . . . , e2r |p · 1 = 0, e2i = ei ,
and ei ej = 0 for all i, ji,

and a triangular basis. The triangular basis as described by the authors applies an invertible
linear transformation of the form
tj =

X

eij ,

i∈Fj

where Fj denotes a set of indices. These index sets satisfy the property that Fj ⊆ Fk whenever
j < k. As the elements in this basis are not orthogonal, homomorphic multiplication does
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not occur component-wise. Rather, it follows the property that ti tk = tk whenever j ≤ k.
A plaintext element x ∈ P is encrypted as
Encrypt(x) = x + E0

where
r
X

E0 =

(xj − wj (x1 , . . . , xj−1 )) · hj (x1 , . . . , xr )

j=n+1

for random hj ∈ C. This plaintext element is then converted to the published triangular
basis. To decrypt, the data owner simply converts the ciphertext back to the basis {xi }ri=1
then replaces xj with wj (x1 , . . . , xj−1 ) for j = n + 1, . . . , r.
The authors show that this scheme is secure against a ciphertext-only attack. This
scheme has the advantage of not accumulating noise terms during computation. Thus, the
only limit on computation in the GKS scheme lies in the value of the prime modulus p in
the definition of the ring S.

3.7

Encoding Data for Fully Homomorphic Computation

Fully homomorphic computation can only be completely utilized over data encoded in a fully
homomorphic manner. Various types of data such as strings, integers, and floats must be
encoded such that computation over these values preserves the fully homomorphic properties
of the scheme. For instance, the ASCII encoding for 0 is 48 – but 48 + 48 = 96, the ASCII
code for the grave accent. Encoding via ASCII will not suffice when encrypted addition is
required.
In addition to a fully homomorphic encoding method it is important that the method
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chosen is efficient in terms of memory usage. While the precise methods of encoding depend on the structure of the encryption scheme, often what is required is an encoding with
integer values. Fully homomorphic encoding methods used in the FHE software SEAL are
described below. The fully homomorphic encoding method for GKS encryption are discussed
in Chapter 4

3.7.1

Fully Homomorphic Encoding in SEAL

SEAL, or the Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library, is a software for performing machine
learning using FHE developed by Microsoft. A previous version of SEAL implemented a variant of the YASHE scheme developed by researchers at Microsoft’s Cryptography Research
Group [21]. The most recent version of Microsoft’s Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library
(SEAL) [43] implements the “FullRNS” variant [4] of the Fan-Vercauteren somewhat homomorphic scheme [25].

Encoding Integers
Plaintexts and ciphertexts in the YASHE implementation of SEAL are polynomials in the
ring Rt = Zt [x]/(xn + 1) and Rq = Zq [x]/(xn + 1), respectively. The authors provide three
methods for encoding integer values.
The first method is the least memory efficient, but the most straightforward. A plaintext
value y ∈ Z is encoded as the constant polynomial p(x) = y. This encoding method requires
the moduli t and q to be incredibly large to avoid overflow. The second method they present
is to encode a value y ∈ Z as using its binary representation y =

i
i bi 2

P

for bits bi , and

encoding a plaintext polynomial
p(x) =

X

bi x i .

i

Decoding is performed by evaluating p(2). The authors explain that this method may be
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applied to base-b encodings for larger integers b, with higher base values resulting in shorter
polynomials with larger coefficients.
The last encoding method described is based off of the Chinese Remainder Theorem
(CRT). A plaintext is encoded multiple times under co-prime moduli t1 , . . . , tk . The CRT
allows for decoding by combining these individual plaintexts under a single modulus

Q

ti .

While this encoding method requires more space, it does allow for much smaller moduli.

Encoding Reals
Real values can be encoded in the YASHE version of SEAL by scaling them to integer values
and performing scaling after every use of homomorphic multiplication. However, this often
results in prohibitively large integers that must be encoded. Instead, the authors suggest
encoding floating point values again via binary representation. A floating point value y can
be represented as y+ + y− , where y+ =

PB

i
i=0 bi 2

and y− =

PC

−j
j=1 cj 2

for bits bi and cj . The

plaintext y may then be encoded as

X
i≤B

bi x i −

X

xn−j cj .

j<C

This method requires reserving the coefficients for the integer and fractional parts of y before
of encoding.

Plaintext Packing
The authors suggest a method called plaintext packing to decrease the number of computations that must be performed. This method involves encoding multiple small messages
as one large message in order to reduce overall run time, using what is called the single
instruction multiple data (SIMD) paradigm.
The method for plaintext packing in YASHE SEAL involves using co-prime polynomials
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Q1 , . . . , Qk such that
xn + 1 =

k
Y

Qi (x)

(mod t).

i=1

There is an isomorphism between the ring R and a co-prime polynomial version of the ring
given by
k
Zt [x]
Zt [x] ∼ Y
=
n
(x + 1) i=1 (Qi (x))

(mod t).

Multiple values can be encoded at once as the constant coefficient of each of the k factors.
Above is a formulation of the Chinese Remainder Theorem over rings. The most recent
version of SEAL [43] based off of the CV encryption scheme similarly uses the Chinese
Remainder Theorem in order to provide SIMD operations, which they call “batching.”

3.7.2

Fully homomorphic encoding in GKS

Gribov, Kahrobaei, and Shpilrain provide a method for encoding integer values within the
platform ring of the GKS cryptosystem [36]. A fully homomorphic embedding of Zp into the
platform ring Sn is chosen. This corresponds to letting the element 1 ∈ Zp be mapped to
any idempotent in S.
Methods for encoding real numbers as well as implementing SIMD batching within the
GKS cryptosystem are presented in this work. Chapter 4 discusses methods for these encodings, as well as various other implementation methods for the GKS cryptosystem.

3.8

Conclusions

Current methods in privacy-preserving classification span non-FHE encryption methods,
FHE methods, and differential privacy. Fully homomorphic encryption developed quickly
from its first presentation by Gentry to the more efficient forms available today. Popular
schemes such as YASHE [5] and FV [25] have been implemented for machine learning tasks
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using HElib [59] and SEAL [43], respectively. The GKS scheme [36] is a conceptually simple
scheme without the noise seen in other FHE schemes. Methods for the efficient implementation of GKS encryption for real-world classification tasks will be proposed throughout the
remainder of this dissertation.

Chapter 4
Implementation of the
Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS)
Scheme
There are a number of implementation issues that must be addressed when performing fully
homomorphic encryption over real world data. The encoding method used for integers, floats,
and rationals needs to result in fully homomorphic computations within the ring.
In addition to a fully homomorphic encoding method it is important that the method
chosen is efficient in terms of memory usage. While the precise methods of encoding depend
on the structure of the encryption scheme, often what is required is an encoding with integer
values. The GKS scheme requires all elements to be embedded as ring elements with coefficients in Zp . This ring structure can be taken advantage of in order to implement single
instruction, multiple data (SIMD) instructions to maximize the amount of computations
carried out in a single instruction.
This chapter outlines parameter selection for applications using the GKS scheme as well
as implementation algorithms, fully homomorphic encoding methods, and how to implement
45
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SIMD instructions within GKS in order to maximize the efficiency of the memory used by the
program. This chapter concludes by providing data on the speed of the described algorithms
in a C++ implementation.

4.1

Fully Homomorphic Encoding of Real-World Values in GKS

Because the GKS encryption scheme is based off of rings elements with coefficients in the field
Zp , any encoding used will have to be based off of integer values. Gribov, Kahrobaei, and
Shpilrain provide a straightforward method of implementing a fully homomorphic encoding
[36]. Any fully homomorphic embedding of Zp into the ring Sn will suffice. In particular, it
is sufficient to map the element 1 in Zp to any idempotent element of S.
Encoding Reals
Real-valued variables must also be encoded as elements of the plaintext ring. This method
should encode floating point values as integer values, be fully homomorphic, avoid overflow
in Zp , and not lose any accuracy compared to the unencrypted operations.
To achieve this, scale floating point values to integer values with a fixed level of precision.
Encode with n digits of precision using an encoding function Encode(x) := bx · 10n c. For
instance, if n = 3 encode x = 0.29128 as
Encode(x) = b0.29128 · 103 c = 291.
Extend this to an encoding in the ring Sn by mapping x to a fixed idempotent value in S.
Decode simply by retrieving the coefficient of the fixed idempotent value in S and multiplying
by 10−n .
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This certainly yields an additively homomorphic embedding of a floating-point value
in the ring. Maintaining a multiplicatively homomorphic property requires keeping track
of the depth of each element. Consider first an example: the floating-point value 0.291
multiplied by 0.895 yields 0.260445. However, the depth 3 encoded value 291 multiplied
by 895 yields 260445, which decodes to 260.445. Hence, to achieve a fully homomorphic
encoding, keep track of the depth of each encoded value and decode accordingly. The depth
of an encoded value is initialized to d = 1, and each time multiplication is performed, it’s
depth is incremented. To decode, multiply the coefficient by 10−dn .
Note furthermore only elements which share a depth may be multiplied. To increase the
depth of an element, simply multiply by the scalar 10n . Keep proper track of the depth of
elements during implementation in order to perform homomorphic multiplication.
Furthermore, the prime modulus p must be selected properly to avoid overflow over the
modulus during computation. Note that this problem is not unique to the GKS cryptosystem,
as all of the FHE schemes surveyed encode floating points as integer values in the range
(−p/2, p/2]. The prime modulus must be chosen during parameter selection to be large
enough to avoid overflow during computation.

4.2

Parallelization via SIMD

SIMD, introduced in Chapter 2.3, is implemented in the GKS scheme by encoding multiple
plaintext values within a single plaintext ring element, i.e., by mapping each to a unique
idempotent element in the ring basis. Note, however, that not every selection of idempotent
elements results in a fully homomorphic encoding. Consider the plaintext ring Sn ,
Sn = hx1 , x2 , . . . , xn |p · 1 = 0, x2i = xi , and xi xj = xj xi for all i, ji.
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Figure 4.1: SIMD Implementation in the GKS scheme
Two values are encoded simultaneously in a ring element by mapping each to fixed idempotent element, e.g. x1 and x1 xn . Then,

(a1 x1 + b1 x1 xn ) + (a2 x1 + b2 x1 xn ) = (a1 + a2 )x1 + (b1 + b2 )x1 xn

and addition is homomorphic over each element. However, multiplication via this encoding
is not homomorphic component-wise, as

(a1 x1 + b1 x1 xn )(a2 x1 + b2 x1 xn ) = a1 a2 x1 + (a1 b2 + b1 a2 + b1 b2 )x1 xn

(4.1)

when a true SIMD operation would yield a1 a2 x1 + b1 b2 x1 xn . Therefore, implementing SIMD
requires a method of encoding multiple values within a single vector that is multiplicatively
homomorphic not just over the ring elements, but also over the encoded coefficients.
In order to implement SIMD, the properties of the ring elements are used in order to
describe a multiple embedding. With that in mind as the ultimate goal, consider the following
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Proposition 4.2.1. Let I, J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be two subsets of indexes, and consider the two
idempotent elements in Sn generated by these subsets defined as

xI =

Y

xi and xJ =

i∈I

Y

j ∈ Jxj .

Encoding two elements within a vector as coefficients of xI and xJ will yield a fully homomorphic encoding if I ∩ J 6= I and I ∩ J 6= J.
Proof. Assume I ∩ J 6= I and I ∩ J 6= J. Then,
(a1 xI + b1 xJ )(a2 xI + b2 xJ ) = a1 a2 xI + b1 b2 xJ + (a1 b2 + a2 b1 )xI xJ .

Since I ∩J 6= I and I ∩J 6= J, then xI xJ 6= xI and xI xJ 6= xJ . Therefore, decoding the above
product yields a1 a2 and b1 b2 , the correct product, and xI xJ contains a value which may be
ignored. Inductively, this extends to any collection I1 , I2 , . . . , Ik ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} satisifying
Ii ∩ Ij 6= Ii and Ii ∩ Ij 6= Ij for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k.
While there are many subsets of elements that satisfy this criterion, a straightforward
approach is to select distinct subsets Ii , . . . , Ik such that |I1 | = |I2 | = · · · = |Ik |. If |Ij | = s
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, then the number of SIMD slots available via this method is maximized
whenever

 
n
s

achieves its maximum over s. This corresponds to the maximum value for a

binomial coefficient and occurs when s = bn/2c or s = dn/2e.
Proposition 4.2.2. Assume that



n
bn/2c



integer values are simultaneously encoded in the

GKS scheme by mapping each element as the coefficient of the ring element generated by a
set of indexes I satisfying |I| = bn/2c. This embedding remains fully homomorphic when
random values are encoded as the coefficients of elements generated by index sets J where
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|J| > |I|, but fails to be fully homomorphic if there are any nonzero coefficients for elements
with index sets where |J| < |I|.
Proof. For the former case, consider two sets of indexes I and J where |I| = bn/2c and
|J| > |I|. Then, the product xI xJ = xK has an index set K where |K| > |I|. This value will
have no impact on the values of the coefficients of the encoded elements.
An example of the latter case is available in Equation 4.1. More generally, say there is
a nonzero coefficient for an element with index set |J| < |I|, called xJ . Let xI be a word
where |I| = bn/2c and J ⊂ I, which must exist for some set of indexes as |J| < |I|. Then,
(a1 xI + b1 xJ )(a2 xI + b2 xJ ) = a1 a2 xI + b1 b2 xJ + (a1 b2 + a2 b1 )xI xJ
= (a1 a2 + a1 b2 + a2 b1 )xI + b1 b2 xJ ,

since xI xJ = xI .
Example 4.2.3. When the plaintext ring is generated by n = 5 elements in the GKS scheme,
the described encoding method allows for

5
2

 

= 10 elements to be simultaneously encoded in

SIMD slots as coefficients of the elements x1 x2 , x1 x3 , x1 x4 , x1 x5 , x2 x3 , x2 x4 , x2 x5 , x3 x4 ,
x3 x5 , and x4 x5 . Furthermore, the values generated by 3, 4, and 5 elements may be assigned
random coefficients during encoding.

SIMD via Orthogonal Elements
A second fully homomorphic encoding utilizing SIMD slots is attained using the orthogonal
representation of ring elements. Recall that ring elements are initially embedded in the
standard basis in the plaintext ring
Sn = hx1 , x2 , . . . , xn |p · 1 = 0, x2i = xi , and xi xj = xj xi for all i, ji
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which is extended to the ring Sr for r > n via the method described in Chapter 3. Elements
are then converted to a representation in the orthogonal basis as
Sn = he1 , e2 , . . . , e2r |p · 1 = 0, e2i = ei , and ei ej = 0 for all i 6= ji
via the change-of-basis
eF :=

Y
i∈F

xi ·

Y
j6∈F

(1 − xj )

for all sets of indexes F ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n, . . . , r}.
A set A = ai of 2n integers can be simultaneously encoded in the GKS scheme using this
transformation over the original plaintext ring. Let aF denote the element of A with index
i=

P

f ∈F

2f −1 . In other words, use the binary representation of the selection of indexes F

in order to perform a one-to-one mapping of the elements of A. This transformation is given
by




Encode(A) =

X
F ⊆{1,2,...,n}

aF 

Y
i∈F

xi ·

Y
j6∈F

(1 − xj ) .

Values are decoded by inverting the orthogonal transformation in Sn . This method requires
more effort to implement encoding but allows for 2n elements to be encoded simultaneously.
With the settings recommended by Gribov, Kahrobaei, and Shiplirain, a total of 25 = 32
values may be encoded in one ciphertext via this method. Note that when implementing
encryptions via this encoding, restrictions on an acceptable encryption of zero must be put
in place to require that no coefficient in the encryption of zero is equal to 0.
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4.3

Generating the Triangular Basis Transformation

Encryption in the GKS scheme, discussed in Chapter 3, begins with elements expressed in
terms of the standard basis in the ring
C = hx1 , x2 , . . . , xr |p · 1 = 0, x2i = xi , and xi xj = xj xi for all i, ji.

(4.2)

Elements are then converted to the orthogonal basis via the transformation given by

eF :=

Y
i∈F

xi ·

Y
j6∈F

(1 − xj )

for each set of indexes F . Assign each orthogonal element eF a numerical index by setting
eF = ei where i =

P

f ∈F

2f −1 . As above, this corresponds simply to converting the binary

representation of the choice of index subset to decimal.
Lastly the ciphertext is transformed into the triangular basis, which satisfies

tj =

X

eij ,

i∈Fj

for a set of indexes Fj , where Fj ⊆ Fk whenever j ≤ k for k from 1 to 2r .
Implementation of GKS encryption requires a method for randomly generating a triangular basis satisfying the above conditions. The only truly invertible linear transformation
of the above form is given by
tm =

m
X

ek

i=1

for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2r .
In order to introduce randomness to this transformation, randomly repeat m of the rows.
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The final, public ciphertext ring is given by
C̃ = ht1 , t2 , . . . , t2r +m |p · 1 = 0, e2i = ei ,
and ei ej = 0 for all i, ji.

Note that in the published basis, homomorphic addition occurs component-wise and the
homomorphic multiplication operation is given by ti tj = ti whenever i ≤ j.
Elements in the orthogonal basis are not uniquely represented by elements in the triangular basis. For example, if t1 = e1 , t2 = e1 , t3 = e1 + e2 , and t4 = e1 + e2 , then the
element e2 in the orthogonal basis can be written in the triangular basis in four ways: t3 − t1 ,
t3 − t2 , t4 − t1 , or t4 − t2 . When converting from the orthogonal to the triangular basis,
the user should randomly choose which representation to use during each conversion. While
this transformation is not invertible in the traditional sense, the key holder can convert back
to the orthogonal basis during decryption easily by replacing each ti with its corresponding
orthogonal basis form and combining like terms.

4.3.1

Algorithms for Triangular Basis Implementation

The triangular basis should be generated during the KeyGen phase of GKS encryption. The
proposed method for creating the triangular basis requires randomly repeating some number
of rows, say m rows. The number of rows repeated can be given as a parameter during
key generation or can be randomized during key generation. In either case, the number of
repeated rows will be published along with the ciphertext ring.
Below the necessary algorithms for conversion between the orthogonal and triangular
bases are outlined. Algorithm 1 describes the method for computing the change-of-basis
matrix to the triangular basis from the orthogonal basis. Algorithm 2 describes the method
for generating the change-of-basis matrix for the orthogonal from the triangular basis. Be-
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cause this is not a linear transformation, Algorithm 3 describes the process for converting
an element from orthogonal to triangular, and is followed by a discussion of the method for
converting an element for triangular to orthogonal.
Algorithm 1 The triangular basis in terms of the orthogonal basis
Input: The orthogonal basis e1 , e2 , . . . , e2r and a set of m indexes F ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 2r }.
Output: The triangular basis t1 , t2 , . . . , t2r̂ +m in terms of the orthogonal basis.
1:

k = 1.

2:

for i = 1 to 2r + m do

. To index over the triangular basis elements.

3:

tk =

4:

k+=1.

5:

if i ∈ F then

6:

tk = tk−1

7:

k+=1.

8:

Pi

j=1 ei .

. Repeat rows listed in F .

end if

9:

end for

Recall that the triangular basis, without representation, is given in terms of the orthogonal basis by tj =

Pm

i=1 ek .

As this is a linear transformation, its inverse is given by e1 = t1

and
ej = tj − tj−1
for all 2 ≤ j ≤ 2r + m. If row j is repeated then ej can be represented as
ej = tj − tj−1
ej = tj+1 − tj−1
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and if tj−1 is a repetition of the row tj−2 , then ej can additionally be represented by

ej = tj − tj−2
ej = tj+1 − tj−2 .
Each orthogonal element can be represented in one, two, or four ways in terms of the triangular basis depending on the indexes of repeated rows. Because the transformation in
Algorithm 1 is not invertible, Algorithm 2 operates by providing four possible representations of each orthogonal generator ej = ej,1 = ej,2 = ej,3 = ej,4 in terms of triangular
generators, some of which may be duplicates.
Example 4.3.1. Consider the set of orthogonal generators {e1 , e2 , e3 , e4 }. Let F = {2, 3} be
the set of indexes to generate the repeated rows in the triangular basis. Then, the triangular
basis is generated by Algorithm 2 as

t1 = e1
t2 = e1 + e2
t3 = e1 + e2
t4 = e1 + e2 + e3
t5 = e1 + e2 + e3
t6 = e1 + e2 + e3 + e4 .

CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF GKS-FHE

56

Algorithm 2 The orthogonal basis in terms of the triangular basis
Input: The triangular basis t1 , t2 , . . . , t2r +m , the set of m indexes F ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 2r }.
Output: The orthogonal basis e1,1 , e1,2 , e1,3 , e1,4 , e2,1 , e2,2 , e2,3 , e2,4 . . . , e2r ,1 , e2r ,2 , e2r ,3 , e2r ,4
in terms of the triangular basis where ei,j = ei .
1:

k = 1.

2:

while i <= 4 · 2r do

3:

if i ∈ F then

4:
5:
6:

. To index over the orthogonal basis elements.

ei,1 = tk , ei,2 = tk , ei,3 = tk+1 , ei,4 = tk+1
else
ei,1 = tk , ei,2 = tk , ei,3 = tk , ei,4 = tk

7:

end if

8:

if i = 1 then

9:

continue

10:

end if

11:

if i − 1 ∈ F then

12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

. If the currently indexed row is repeated.

. If the previously indexed row is repeated.

ei,1 -=tk−1 , ei,2 -=tk−2 , ei,3 -=tk−1 , ei,4 -=tk−2 .
else
ei,1 -=tk−1 , ei,2 -=tk−1 , ei,3 -=tk−1 , ei,4 -=tk−1 .
end if
end while
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Example 4.3.2. The orthogonal basis is generated from the triangular basis in Example
4.3.1 via Algorithm 2 as

e1,1 = t1 ,

e1,2 = t1 ,

e1,3 = t1 ,

e1,4 = t1

e2,1 = t2 − t1 ,

e2,2 = t2 − t1 ,

e2,3 = t3 − t1 ,

e2,4 = t3 − t1

e3,1 = t4 − t3 ,

e3,2 = t4 − t2 ,

e3,3 = t5 − t3 ,

e3,4 = t5 − t2

e4,1 = t6 − t5 ,

e4,2 = t6 − t4 ,

e4,3 = t6 − t5 ,

e4,4 = t6 − t4

In Algorithm 3, the ring elements in the orthogonal basis are converted to the triangular
basis by randomly selecting one of the four possible representations of that element ei in the
triangular basis as ei,1 , ei,2 , ei,3 , or ei,4 .
Algorithm 3 Converting an element from orthogonal to triangular
Input: A ring element in the orthogonal basis, a = a1 e1 + a2 e2 + · · · + a2r̂ e2r̂ , as well as the
triangular in terms of orthogonal basis of Algorithm 1.
Output: The corresponding word in the triangular basis.
1:

for i from 1 to 2r̂ do

2:

Select ei = ei,j for random j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.

3:

Replace ei with ei,j in a.

4:

end for

5:

Simplify by combining like terms.

The algorithm for conversion from the triangular basis to the orthogonal basis is straightforward and proceeds by replacing each triangular element ti with its representation in the
orthogonal basis as generated in Algorithm 2.
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4.4

Homomorphic Evaluation

Assume there are r generators in the ciphertext ring. Then, there are 2r elements of the ring
in the orthogonal basis. After the triangular transformation, with repetition of m rows, the
size of the published ring is given by r̂ = 2r + m.
Assume there are two ring elements a, b ∈ C to be added, where a = a1 t1 + · · · + ar̂ tr̂ and
b = b1 t1 + · · · + br̂ tr̂ . Addition occurs component-wise and is carried out as in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Homomorphic Addition in the Triangular Basis
Input: a = a1 t1 + · · · + ar tr̂ , b = b1 t1 + · · · + br̂ tr̂ , p
Output: c = a + b = c1 t1 + · · · + cr̂ tr̂
1:
2:
3:

for i = 1 to r̂ do
ci = ai + bi (mod p)
end for

Next, the values a, b ∈ C are to be multiplied. To compute this product use the identity
ti tj = tj whenever i ≤ j. This product can be expressed in terms of the triangular basis as
follows:
a·b=

r̂
X

!

ai ti

i=1

r̂
X

!

bi ti =

i=1

r̂
X




i=1

i−1
X



(ai bj + aj bi ) + ai bi  ti .

j=1

To show correctness, start by expanding the center term.
r̂
X
i=1

!

ai ti

r̂
X
i=1

!

bi ti = a1 b1 t1 + a1 b2 t2 + a1 b3 t3 + · · · + a1 br̂ tr̂
+ a2 b1 t2 + a2 b2 t2 + a2 b3 t3 + · · · + a2 br̂ tr̂
+ ···
+ ar̂ b1 tr̂ + ar̂ b2 tr̂ + ar̂ b3 tr̂ + · · · + ar̂ br̂ tr̂ .
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This product may be rewritten by grouping over ti . The coefficient terms may then be
reordered for a new expression of the product as a sum.
Grouping terms over ti yields

=a1 b1 t1 + (a1 b2 + a2 b1 + a2 b2 )t2
+ (a1 b3 + a2 b3 + a3 b1 + a3 b2 + a3 b3 )t3 + · · ·
+ (a1 br̂ + a2 br̂ + · · · + ar̂−1 br̂ + ar̂ b1 + ar̂ b2 + · · · + ar̂ br̂ )tr̂
=a1 b1 t1 + (a1 b2 + a2 b1 + a2 b2 )t2
+ (a1 b3 + a3 b1 + a2 b3 + a3 b2 + a3 b3 )t3 + · · ·
+ (a1 br̂ + ar̂ b1 + a2 br̂ + ar̂ b2 · · · + ar̂−1 br̂ + ar̂ br̂−1 + ar̂ br̂ )tr̂
=

r̂
X




i=1

i−1
X





(ai bj + aj bi ) + ai bi  ti .

j=1

With this expression of the product, one may implement multiplication via Protocol 5.
Algorithm 5 Homomorphic Multiplication in the Triangular Basis
Input: a = a1 t1 + · · · + ar tr̂ , b = b1 t1 + · · · + br̂ tr̂ , p
Output: c = a · b = c1 t1 + · · · + cr̂ tr̂
1:

for i = 1 to r̂ do

2:

c i = 1 · ai · b i

3:

for j = 1 to i − 1 do

4:
5:
6:

ci += ai · bj + aj · bi (mod p)
end for
end for

CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF GKS-FHE

4.5

60

Computational Complexity

The complexity of the algorithms used for implementation of GKS will have an effect on its
performance speed. Algorithm 4 carries out addition component-wise in r̂ steps, where r̂ is
the number of generators in the published ciphertext ring. Therefore, addition occurs with
a complexity of Θ(r̂).
Multiplication, seen in Algorithm 5, occurs in a nested loop. Line 2 of this algorithm is
a step of complexity O(1) which occurs in the outer loop. The inner loop contains one step
of complexity O(1), and executes i − 1 times during iteration i of the outer loop. Therefore,
the complexity of Algorithm 5 is derived by
r̂
X
i=1

(1 + (i − 1)) =

r̂(r̂ + 1)
2

and yields a complexity of O(r̂2 ).

4.6

Generating Encryptions of Zero

Parameters for the GKS scheme must be selected in order to avoid overflow over the prime
modulus p during computation. With this in mind a second parameter, q ∈ N, must be
introduced, where q  p. During generation of random noise within the encryption algorithm, the random values chosen as coefficients to ring elements should be selected to lie
in the range [0, q). The precise size of the variable q is application-dependent and should
be selected so that overflow over the prime modulus p does not occur during homomorphic
multiplication.
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KeyGen

Encrypt

Decrypt

Add

Multiply

32-bit modulus

1.3186

0.0327

0.0585

0.0001

0.0229

64-bit modulus

1.3157

0.0337

0.0616

0.0001

0.0299

128-bit modulus

1.3905

0.0411

0.0665

0.0001

0.0311

256-bit modulus

1.5719

0.0448

0.0738

0.0001

0.0346

512-bit modulus

1.6333

0.0450

0.0758

0.0002

0.0361

1024-bit modulus

1.6373

0.0455

0.0763

0.0002

0.0402

Table 4.1: Average implementation times for the GKS cryptosystem in seconds

4.7

Experimental Performance

Experiments were run to determine average computation speed via GKS using the default
parameters combined with the implementation recommendations in this chapter. Operations
were carried out over randomly generated values. The times reported in Table 4.1 were
generated by repeating the protocol 1, 000 times and calculating the average run time.
Values for random noise generation were uniformly selected from the range [0, 2n−1 ) for
each n-bit prime. This is higher than what will generally need to be used, and therefore
provides a safe over-estimate of the needed computation time. Tests were run on a Macbook
Pro with a 2.3 Ghz processor and 16.0 GB memory using C++ and the GNU MP Bignum
Library [62] for arbitrary precision arithmetic. Table 4.1 shows the experimental results for
these algorithms.
Figures 4.2 through 4.6 contains several sub-figures which show the bit size of the prime
modulus on the horizontal axis and time, in seconds, on the vertical axis. Figure 4.2 shows
that key generation is the most costly step, and larger prime modulus values correspond to
larger key generation times. However, even with a 1024-bit prime modulus, the average key
generation time is below 1.5 seconds. Homomorphic addition, shown in Figure 4.4, is a very
fast operation regardless of prime modulus size and should not represent a bottleneck during
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computation. Figure 4.5 shows homomorphic multiplication, which takes longer than homomorphic addition with an average computation time of between 0.02 and 0.03 seconds. When
many multiplication operations are needed, this could pose as a bottleneck to computation.
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Figure 4.6: Average Computation Time in GKS
Figure 4.3 shows the encryption and decryption times for plaintext and ciphertext values,
respectively. The plaintext values in these experiments were randomly generated by populating the coefficients in the plaintext ring with values in the range [0, 2n−1 ). Encryption is
a more computationally intensive process, as it involves randomization steps and generation
of random noise. Decryption consists of a series of substitutions using the private key and
the time required remains relatively constant with varying modulus sizes. While encryption
and decryption of a value takes longer than addition or multiplication, it should not pose
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a bottleneck during computation within the proposed setting. Specifically, the algorithms
proposed and implemented in this document require a database to be encrypted and stored
once prior to classification. Decryption is called only a smaller, fixed number of times during
these protocols.

4.7.1

Performance Comparison

ML Confidential [35] implements a leveled homomorpic encryption scheme using a modified
version of a scheme presented by Brakerski [7]. With a 128-bit prime modulus, the authors
report computation times as seen in Table 4.2. While key generation runs faster in this
Scheme

KeyGen

Encrypt

Decrypt

Add

Multiply

ML Confidential [35]

0.279

0.659

0.055

0.001

0.853

SHIELD [41]

0.27

0.383

0.3

0.006

0.372

HElib [59, 41]

85.3

0.59

0.39

0.002

3.6

Table 4.2: Average implementation of existing FHE schemes in seconds
protocol than in the implementation of GKS-FHE in Table 4.1, all other algorithms run
more quickly in GKS-FHE. In particular, multiplication takes place in 0.026 seconds in
GKS-FHE with a 128-bit prime modulus compared to 0.853 seconds in ML Confidential,
and addition takes places in 0.0001 seconds. Key generation is typically run only once per
protocol, while addition and multiplication may need to be run many times.
Halevi and Shoup’s HElib [59], associated with IBM Research, implements the BGV leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme [11] with the Smart-Vercauteren SIMD ciphertext
packing techniques [60] and additional Gentry-Halevi-Smart optimizations [31]. Authors
provide preliminary multiplication times ranging from 25.7 seconds to 473 seconds based
on varying sizes of key generation parameters [38]. A March 2018 update to the project’s
GitHub repository claims forthcoming speedups, which make implementation 15 to 75 times
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faster.
The implementation times for HElib displayed in Table 4.2 are from an implementation
of HElib speed experiments carried out by Khedr et al. in 2015 [41]. The authors in
this work also propose an improvement on the Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) scheme [32]
within a framework they title Secure Homomorphic Implementation of Encrypted DataClassifiers (SHIELD). The authors’ reported implementation speed data for this scheme
is also presented in Table 4.2. These experiments were run on a CPU with 4 cores, 8
threads, and 32 GB of memory. Compared to both of these schemes, GKS encryption
performs encryption, decryption, homomorphic addition, and homomorphic multiplication
significantly faster. Key generation in SHIELD is faster than in GKS, but significantly slower
in HElib. As mentioned before, key generation is performed only once, and fast homomorphic
addition and multiplication times are key to avoiding computational bottlenecks in real-world
applications.
The most recent version of Microsoft’s Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL)
[43] implements the “FullRNS” variant [4] of the Fan-Vercauteren somewhat homomorphic
scheme [25]. Microsoft reports that encoding and encryption of 4096 25 × 25 pixel gray
scale images within a single ciphertext occurs in an average of 44.5 seconds, and decryption of these ciphertexts occurs in 3 seconds [33]. This setting is not directly comparable
to the experiments on GKS-FHE outlined in table 4.1. Another application of SEAL reports computation time in SEAL as 0.002 milliseconds for homomorphic addition and 1.514
milliseconds for homomorphic multiplication [3]. Again, this scenario is not directly comparable to the results provided in Table 4.1, as their experimental setup implemented Microsoft
Azure’s powerful data centers. Specifically, they ran their tests on Azure’s H16 instances
with 16-core 3.6 GHz processors with 112 GB of memory.
The utility of GKS can be seen in the computational complexity of the multiplication
operation. Homomorphic multiplication in GKS corresponds to polynomial multiplication.
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Other ring-based schemes that include noise growth, such as FV [25] and SEAL [43], require
both a multiplication step and a “relinearization” step. While the multiplication step in
schemes of this form may at best correspond to polynomial multiplication, the relinearization
step adds additional complexity to the homomorphic multiplication operations.

4.8

Conclusion

All in all, the GKS fully homomorphic encryption scheme can be implemented efficiently for
operations over real-world data. Computation speeds for key generation, encryption, decryption, addition, and multiplication are competitive with the state-of-the-art implementations
of public-key FHE. The lack of noise during homomorphic operations in the GKS scheme
marks an advantage over leveled and somewhat homomorphic schemes.
Furthermore, SIMD may be implemented in GKS for parallelization of computation. Up
to 2n distinct values may be packed within a single GKS plaintext in a ring with n generators
while preserving homomorphic addition and multiplication operations. Real values and
floating point values are able to be encoded within the scheme.

Chapter 5
Privacy-Preserving Naive Bayes
Classification
A well-known machine learning classifier is Naive Bayes, a model which classifies a new data
point using probabilities computed during a training phase. Naive Bayes earns its “naive”
title due to the strong independence assumptions it makes between the features of the data.
This assumption yields a transparent and understandable method for classification which
often outperforms more sophisticated methods [39]. Similarly, when diagnosing a patient,
clinicians try to define conditionally independent attributes which could be indicative of a
disease [40]. Naive Bayes has outperformed more sophisticated methods and state-of-the-art
diagnosis systems on 5 out of 8 real-life medical data sets, including localization of a primary
tumor, prediction of recurrence of breast cancer, and rheumatological diagnosis [42], as well
as in applications predicting heart disease [40].
Naive Bayes is based on Bayes Theorem. Given a set of classes G to which a sample X
could be assigned, Bayes Theorem states that

Pr(G = Gi |X) =

Pr(X|G = Gi ) Pr(G = Gi )
.
Pr(X)
67

68

CHAPTER 5. PRIVATE NAIVE BAYES

In this formula, Pr(G = Gi |X) represents the posterior probability of a class given an attribute, whereas Pr(X|G = Gi ) is the likelihood of an attribute given a class. Thus the
posterior probability is computed using prior knowledge and observed data.
The Naive Bayes model assumes that the features of the data points are conditionally
independent in each class. For a class G = Gi and a feature space of dimension d with
X = (X1 , . . . , Xd ), the Naive Bayes model assumes that

P (X|G = Gi ) =

d
Y
j=1

P (Xj |G = Gi ).

(5.1)

This does not often hold in the real world, hence the “naive” title.
Despite this, Naive Bayes is able to provide fast results which are often better than
more sophisticated methods when the dimension of the feature space is large. In these
situations, assuming that the features of the space are independent can help avoid clumsy
density estimations. The Naive Bayes classifier does not consider correlation among features,
thus lowering the variance while increasing the bias and hence avoiding over fitting on the
training set. Due to this, it has become a benchmark used by the community in data analysis.
Furthermore, when diagnosing a patient, clinicians try to define conditionally independent
attributes which could be indicative of a disease [40]. Naive Bayes has outperformed more
sophisticated methods and state-of-the-art diagnosis systems on 5 out of 8 real-life medical
data sets, including localization of a primary tumor, prediction of recurrence of breast cancer,
and rheumatological diagnosis [42], as well as in applications predicting heart disease [40].
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5.1

Naive Bayes Classification

The classification of a vector X is given simply by taking the maximum posterior probability
over all classes and applying Bayes’ Theorem.

Ĝ = argmax Pr(G = Gi |X)
Gi ∈G

= argmax
Gi ∈G

Pr(X|G = Gi ) Pr(G = Gi )
Pr(X)

= argmax Pr(X|G = Gi ) Pr(G = Gi )
Gi ∈G

= argmax Pr(G = Gi )
Gi ∈G

d
Y
j=1

Pr(X = Xj |G = Gi ).

Note that the denominator term Pr(X) can be removed because X is fixed, while the last
step follows from the independence assumption in equation 5.1.
Commonly, in medical applications each attribute Xj of a vector X can take on only a
discrete set of values. Then, all of the information needed to classify an arbitrary data point
can be succinctly represented in a collection of vectors and matrices. This representation
will enable us to collect all data needed in order to perform a classification. The ease with
which all this data can be represented will be of great use in the protocol which follows. Let
P = (Pi ) be a vector where
Pi = Pr(G = Gi )
and let T be a matrix where the (i, j)th entry Ti,j is equal to

Ti,j = Pr(Xj |G = Gi ).
Given tables P and T , any new data point can be classified by looking up the probability
for each attribute given each class and computing the argmax of the resulting values.
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Bost et al.

The Model Owner creates a

implement private Naive

learned model using Naive Bayes.

Bayes classification between a Client and a

The Model Owner encrypts her

Service Provider [6]. The Client has a single

learned model using a fully homomor-

data vector X which he would like to keep

phic private key encryption scheme.

private. The service provider owns a private

The Model Owner publishes her en-

model w which she would like to keep pri-

crypted Naive Bayes learned model.

vate. Given a classification algorithm C the
The Client calculates his (encrypted) class

client should be able to learn C(X, w), the

probabilities using his private data point.

classification of his vector X using the model

The Client determines his final classification

w, without learning any partial information

using a privacy-preserving argmax protocol.

about the model or giving away any infor-

Figure 5.1: Private Naive Bayes Classification mation about his input.
Let pkQ , skQ denote a public and secret
key pair in the QR scheme and pkP , skP denote the same in Paillier. Let square brackets JaKP
denote the encryption of a value a under Paillier. The security of these schemes provides
semantic security for the authors’ protocols, and an honest-but-curious adversary model is
used.
Assume each vector X has d features, each of which can take on a finite number of
possible values, and that there are c possible classes. The authors’ protocol runs as follows:
1:

The Service Provider encrypts the tables P and T using Paillier.

2:

The Server sends the encrypted tables to the Client.

3:

The Client computes Jpi KP = JPi KP

Qd

j=1 JTi,j (Xj )KP

for i = 1, . . . , c.

4:

The Client uses the server to compute i = argmaxi pi .

5:

Client outputs i.

Note that Step 3 of the above protocol requires the encryption scheme which is multiplicatively homomorphic. To get around this requirement, Bost et al. implement the model using
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the logarithm of the probability distributions, where pi = log(Pr(G = Gi |X)). Therefore,
the posterior probabilities in Step 3 are computed using Paillier’s additively homomorphic
property. Computing the argmax in Step 4 requires an additively homomorphic scheme.
Bost et al. use Paillier and QR, combined with an algorithm for changing the encryption
scheme, in order to compute the argmax. In the next section, we describe our adapted
version of the protocol which performs classification using a single encryption scheme.

5.2

Proposed Method for Fully Homomorphic Naive
Bayes Classification

The protocol presented below varies in several important ways from the previous protocol.
Use of a fully homomorphic scheme adds flexibility to the computation by allowing the posterior probabilities to be computed using homomorphic multiplication or in the logarithmic
model using homomorphic addition. Furthermore, the presented model assumes direct communication between the Model Owner and the Client. In other words, there is not a trusted
server acting as intermediary between the parties. The protocol could easily be adapted to
include a Server to carry out computations, if desired.
The protocol is designed as follows. Assume that a Client wishes to classify his vector X
which contains d features based off of a learned model w owned by the Model Owner. The
group of classes G contains c distinct classes, G1 , . . . , Gc . During this protocol the Model
Owner should learn no unnecessary information about the input provided by the Client, and
the Client should learn nothing but the predicted class index of X.
There is a certain amount of information which the Client must know in order to carry out
the protocol. Namely, the Client must know that the data vector X has d features and that
there are exactly c classes. However, he should not be able to deduce any information about
the conditional class probabilities associated with the d features or the c class probabilities.
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Because the Model Owner has already computed a learned model, she prepares two
tables. First, the Model Owner prepares table P represented as a column vector of degree
c where Pi = Pr(G = Gi ), the prior probability on class Gi . Next she prepares a table T ,
where entry Tij represents Pr(Xj |G = Gi ). The protocol is given in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Fully Homomorphic Private Naive Bayes Classifier
Client Input: A data point X.
Model Owner Input: A learned Naive Bayes model with tables P and T of prior class
probabilities and likelihoods, respectively.
Client Output: Classification of the data point X under the Model Owner’s model.
1:

The Model Owner prepares the tables P and T and sends their encryption, JP K and JT K,
to the Client.

2:

For each class Gi for i from 1 to c, the Client is able to compute

JP r(Gi |X)K = JP r(Gi )K ·
= JPi K ·
= JPi ·
3:

d
Y

JP r(Xj |Gi )K

j=1

d
Y

JTij K

j=1

d
Y
j=1

Tij K.

The Client computes
i = argmax JP r(Gi |X)K
1≤i≤c

using the private argmax protocol described below in Algorithm 8.

If the model was designed using logarithms of the probabilities, then the multiplication
operations in Step 2 should be replaced with addition.
There are two parties to consider when discussing the security of this protocol: the privacy
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of the Client’s information as well as the privacy of the Model Owner’s learned model.
The privacy of the learned model is derived entirely from the security of the encryption
scheme used. Discussion of the privacy of the Data Owner’s information, however, requires
knowledge of the argmax protocol called in Step 3. This argmax protocol is outlined in
Section 5.2.1, and the overall security of the protocol is discussed in Section 5.3.

5.2.1

Privacy-Preserving Argmax Protocol

Attempts at the argmax protocol that contain security leaks are first described in order to
build intuition for working up to a secure framework. Denote Ei = JPr(Gi |X)K, and the set
of all Ei as E.
First, suppose the Client sends the set of encrypted probability values E to the Model
Owner. Then, the Model Owner decrypts each value and sends the Client the index of the
highest value using asymmetric encryption. While the Client has learned nothing about the
model, in this scenario the Model Owner learns not only which class the Client’s data point
belongs to but also the exact probabilities for each class.
Suppose instead that the Client performs a permutation π on the class probabilities, then
sends π(E) to the Model Owner. Then, the Model Owner decrypts the values, determines
which is largest, and sends that index to the Client, who reverses the permutation to determine his class. It is not necessary to hide the value of the index sent to the Client from
any eavesdroppers in this scenario, as the permutation π randomizes the indexes. However,
while this method prevents the Model Owner from determining trivially which probability
is associated with each class, it does not prevent her from learning the class probabilities
themselves.
Another naive attempt at argmax is considered before presenting the secure protocol.
Algorithm 7 breaks down the computation of argmax into a series of comparisons.
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Algorithm 7 A naive attempt at private argmax
Client Input: A set of indexes I = {1, 2, . . . , c}, a family of additively homomorphic
monotone functions F, and a set of c values encrypted under the Model Owner’s private
key.
Client Output: The argmax of the input values, or index of the largest of the c input
encrypted values.
1:

Set I = {1, 2, . . . c}.

2:

while |I| > 1 do

3:

The Client computes a random permutation π on I.

4:

The Client computes E ∗ = Eπ(1) − Eπ(2) . Because the encryption scheme is additively
homomorphic,

Eπ(1) − Eπ(2) = JPπ(1) − Pπ(2) K.
5:

The Client sends E ∗ to the Model Owner.

6:

The Model Owner decrypts E ∗ and recovers
p = Pπ(1) − Pπ(2)
= Pr(Gπ(1) |X) − Pr(Gπ(2) |X).
If this value is negative, the Model Owner sends the bit b = 0 to the Client, otherwise
send b = 1.

7:

If b = 0, the Client removes π(1) from I. Otherwise he removes π(2).

8:

end while

9:

The Client returns I.
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Because the value computed by the Client is random, the bit 0 or 1 will appear random
to any observer. However, the Model Owner recovers some partial information about the
Client’s data. Namely, she recovers a collection of c − 1 values representing the difference
between pairs of the posterior probabilities for different i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c}. While the permutation keeps the Model Owner from knowing which pairs of elements correspond to which
values, it is not outside the realm of possibility that an attack on the Client’s private data
could be carried out by her using this information.
The following problem remains: The Client needs to compare two values encrypted under
the Model Owner’s private key. Previous approaches to this problem focus on public-key
encryption, where the Client can mask his value with random noise encrypted under the
Model Owner’s public key. However, this approach will not work with private-key encryption
because there is no way for the Client to encrypt random noise.
The proposed method for comparison in the private-key setting uses the fully homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. Using the homomorphic properties of encryption,
a family F of additively homomorphic, monotone functions that commute with encryption
is constructed. These functions are used to randomize the values sent to the Model Owner.
Say that a function f : R → R commutes with encryption if
f (JmK) = Jf (m)K.
Furthermore, the additively homomorphic property of f guarantees that f (m + n) = f (m) +
f (n).
The outline of the protocol that uses additively homomorphic encryption and a monotone function to return the argmax is given in Algorithm 8. Possible families of additively
homomorphic monotone functions that can be used with the GKS encryption system are
then discussed in Section 5.4.
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Algorithm 8 Privacy-preserving argmax
Client Input: A set of indexes I = {1, 2, . . . , c}, a family of additively homomorphic
monotone functions F, and a set of c values encrypted under the Model Owner’s private
key.
Client Output: The argmax of the input values, or index of the largest of the c input
encrypted values.
1:

while |I| > 1 do

2:

The Client computes a random permutation π on I.

3:

The Client randomly chooses f ← F and computes the values f Eπ(1) and f Eπ(2) .

4:

The Client uses the additive homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme and









f as well as the commutative property of the function to evaluate






E ∗ = f Eπ(1) − f Eπ(2)









= f JPπ(1) K − f JPπ(2) K
= Jf (Pπ(1) − Pπ(2) )K
5:

The Client sends E ∗ to the Model Owner.

6:

The Model Owner decrypts E ∗ and recovers
f (Pπ(1) − Pπ(2) )
If this value is negative, the Model Owner sends the bit b = 0 to the Client, otherwise
send b = 1.

7:

If b = 0, the Client removes π(1) from I. Otherwise the Client removes π(2).

8:

end while

9:

The Client returns I.
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During this protocol, the Model Owner collects c values representing the result of a monotone function applied to the difference between random pairs of the posterior probabilities.
The application of an unknown monotone function to this difference prevents the Model
Owner from learning partial information about the Client’s values.

5.3

Security

The proposed protocol is secure in the honest-but-curious setting. In this setting, all parties
are assumed to take part in the protocol honestly. However, they will use any information
they can obtain during an honest execution of the protocol in order to attempt to deduce
further information. In this model, parties should not be able to learn any information
beyond their protocol output.
During protocol execution, the Client only has access to encrypted values. The private
argmax protocol allows the Client to determine which encrypted value is the largest out of
a set of values, but does not give him access to the actual values. Therefore, the security
of the Model Owner’s data is reliant upon the security of the fully homomorphic encryption
scheme that is implemented. The GKS scheme is secure against ciphertext-only attack [36].
The only information the Model Owner receives during protocol execution is obtained
during the private argmax protocol. The Model Owner receives the value

f (Pπ(1) − Pπ(2) )
during each elimination round of the argmax protocol. Because of the permutation π, she
does not know which posterior probabilities are being compared, or, in the case of binary
classification, in what order they are being compared. Furthermore, the function f , selected
from a family F of additively homomorphic, monotone functions that commute with encryp-
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tion, hides the exact value of the difference between the randomized posterior probabilities.
Therefore, at the end of protocol execution, the Model Owner is unable to determine any
ordering on the posterior probabilities the Client has computed, and cannot determine his
final classification.

5.4

Implementation

The proposed protocol was run using the GKS encryption scheme, where coefficients in Zp
were taken from (−p/2, p/2] and correspond to positive and negative integers, and

F = {f : R → R : f (m) = km}
for a randomly chosen integer k up to 20 bits. Implementation used a 198-bit prime p.
Experiments were implemented in C++ on a Mac Book Pro using El Capitan, a 2.3 GHz
Intel Core i7, with 16 GB memory. The GNU Multiple Precision Library (GMP) [62] was
implemented to allow for integer storage above the built-in data type limits in C++. An
implementation of the Naive Bayes algorithm created a learned model. This learned model
was encrypted using the GKS Encryption Scheme. Then both encrypted and unencrypted
classification of data points, not included in the training set, was carried out. Section 5.5
describes the results of these experiments.

5.5

Evaluation

Data from the UCI Machine Learning Repository was used to test the performance of the
protocols [45]. Specifically, the Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Original) Data Set was used, which
contains 683 complete data points each containing an ID along with 9 attributes and a binary
classification.
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Accuracy

Sensitivity

Specificity

Precision

NPV

F1-score

Mean

0.96007

0.93398

0.97414

0.95299

0.96546

0.94224

Stand. Dev.

0.02077

0.04861

0.02439

0.04255

0.02469

0.03026

Table 5.1: Naive Bayes Classification Results
The data gives measurements taken from fine-needle aspirate (FNA) biopsies of benign
and malignant breast tumors. These nine attributes include clump thickness, uniformity of
cell size, uniformity of cell shape, marginal adhesion, single epithelial cell size, bare nuclei,
bland chromatin, normal nucleoli, and mitoses. Each of these attributes was measured by a
clinician on a scale of 1 to 10 at the time it was collected, with lower values corresponding to
what you would expect to see in a benign case and higher values corresponding to what you
would expect in a malignant case. Previous research has found that while each measurement
holds clinical significance in diagnosing a breast tumor as benign or as malignant, a single
attribute is not enough to distinguish between the two cases [67].
A Naive Bayes algorithm was implemented to create a learned model which was then
encrypted using the GKS Encryption Scheme. Experiments evaluated the performance of the
model using 10 by 10-fold cross validation. Furthermore, because the data set is unbalanced
with a higher proportion of benign tumors, random oversampling of malignant tumors was
implemented while training the models. A positive case denotes a case where the tumor is
diagnosed as malignant and a negative case refers to a tumor which is benign.
Additive smoothing on the values in the tables of class and prior probabilities was implemented during both encrypted and unencrypted testing to prevent error in the case of
zero or near zero probabilities. Specifically, each probability was increased by 0.1, and any
value which was greater than or equal to 1 after smoothing was reset to 0.999. The size of
the ciphertext ring in the experiments was 28 + 50 = 306, and the prime modulus p was 198
bits.
Classification was tested on data points not included in the training set in both encrypted
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Mean Time
Unencrypted

0.00001

Encrypted

0.40298

Table 5.2: Mean Classification Time, In Seconds
and unencrypted formats. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show a comparison of the average performance
of the encrypted and unencrypted experiments under 10 by 10-fold cross validation. Results
include classification time for a single data point in seconds, accuracy, sensitivity, specificity,
precision, negative predictive value (NPV), and the F1 score. The model in the experiments
was trained with five decimal points precision, and the unencrypted experimental results
were obtained with five decimal points precision. In the encrypted experiments all values
were initially encrypted with three decimal points precision. No change occurred in the
reported statistics due to this change in decimal precision.
In the case of breast cancer specifically it is crucial to positively identify all malignant
tumors for timely medical intervention. The results yield high precision and show higher
sensitivity, meaning there is a low rate of false positives and an even lower rate of false
negatives. Specificity describes the proportion of negative cases which were classified as
negative and NPV describes the proportion of cases classified as negative which were negative
in reality. The results show both high Specificity and high NPV, pointing to a high rate
of true negatives and a low rate of false negatives. The experiments also yielded a high F1
score, which takes into account both the precision and the recall of the classifier.

5.6

Discussion

The proposed method performs classification in an average of 0.40298 seconds, compared to
0.479 seconds per classification in the experiments of Bost et al. [6]. Private classification
methods for more sophisticated classifiers are even more time consuming. Wu et al. perform
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private decision tree classification on a tree with 12 decision nodes in approximately 0.545
seconds [68]. Bost et al. report average decision tree classification times on a 4 node tree in
approximately 2.085 seconds [6]. Rahulamathavan et al. perform private SVM classification
on the same breast cancer data set in an average of 7.71 seconds [54].
The time increase between encrypted and unencrypted computation is expected and
occurs in all current fully homomorphic encryption methods. For the example provided
above, where a single user wishes to classify their data, classification in under half a second
is within a reasonable time range for medical applications.

5.6.1

Computational Bottlenecks

The computational bottleneck within fully homomorphic encryption schemes occurs during
homomorphic multiplication operations. Chapter 4 provides results which show that the
GKS scheme is relatively efficient at performing fully homomorphic multiplication operations.
The amount of time a clinician may expect this protocol to take will depend upon the
number of classes and the number of features within the data set being analyzed, as this
determines the number of homomorphic multiplication operations which must be performed.
Consider a data set with d features and c classes. For each data point classification, a total
of (d + 1) homomorphic multiplication operations must be performed in order to calculate
the posterior probability, calculated as

JP r(Gi |X)K = JP r(Gi )K ·

d
Y

JP r(Xj |Gi )K

j=1

for each of c classes. This results in a total of c(d + 1) multiplication operations per classification.
Communication can also pose a bottleneck to computation, depending on the speed of the
connection between the Client and Model Owner. The argmax protocol presented requires
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that the Model Owner communicates with the Client a total of c − 1 times, and that the
Client communicates with the Model Owner a total of c − 1 times. In the common case of
binary classification, this is only one communication from Model Owner to Client and vice
versa.

5.6.2

Comparison to Other Classifiers

Naive Bayes often outperforms more sophisticated classification methods for medical diagnosis. Examples include prediction of heart disease [40] and rheumatological diagnosis [42].
Classification on the Wisconsin breast cancer data set using decision trees, support vector
machine (SVM), k-nearest neighbors, and logistic regression classification were implemented
in Python 3 under 10-fold cross validation for comparison of classifier performance [39].
Decision trees were limited to a maximum depth of 5, a minimum of 3 samples per split,
and a minimum of 3 samples per leaf. Gini impurity was used to measure the quality of the
split during training. Privacy-preserving decision tree classification is discussed in Chapter
7. Support vector machine (SVM) was implemented with a linear kernel. The k-nearest
neighbors classifier was implemented using the ball tree algorithm with 5 neighbors, a leaf
size of 30, and uniformly weighted points, using the Euclidean distance measure. The logistic
regression model was built using the LIBLINEAR algorithm for optimization of the learning
function [44].
Performance of the classifiers is given in Table 5.3. The highest score for each metric
highlighted in red. Naive Bayes provided the best performance for the negative predicted
value. While other classifiers outperform Naive Bayes on the other metrics, Naive Bayes
remains competitive, especially when the relative speed of privacy-preserving Naive Bayes is
considered.
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Accuracy

Sensitivity

Specificity

Precision

NPV

Naive Bayes

0.96003

0.93389

0.97410

0.95100

0.96476

Decision Tree

0.96628

0.96171

0.97500

0.98699

0.93487

Linear SVM

0.97069

0.96843

0.97500

0.98651

0.94500

k-Nearest Neighbors

0.97065

0.96838

0.97482

0.98646

0.94544

Logistic regression

0.96920

0.97298

0.96232

0.98017

0.95276

Table 5.3: Comparison to other machine learning classifiers, with the highest score for each
metric in red

5.7

Conclusions

This first experiment suggests that private-key fully homomorphic encryption can classify
medical data efficiently. Similar techniques could enable researchers and clinicians to utilize
private medical data and models which they cannot access in the clear. Hospitals and
companies with trained assisted diagnosis systems could use this technology to provide access
to their models without giving away their parameters, and doctors can use this software
without revealing their patient’s information. Medical researchers can use these methods to
determine whether their models are over fit to their own data sets.
In the next chapter, a protocol for third-party private search is introduced. This protocol
is implemented in Chapter 7 for classification via decision trees, further showing the utility
of private-key FHE for classifying medical data.

Chapter 6
Third Party Private Search via Fully
Homomorphic Encryption
6.1

Introduction

Private search describes a variety of multi-party protocols which involve the querying of
encrypted or otherwise privatized data. Private search models follow multiple paradigms.
Data outsourcing describes the model where a data owner would like to store their database
on a server in encrypted form, and wants to search it later themselves. This model does
not seek to hide the database contents from the querying party. In the data sharing model,
also known as Privacy-Preserving Sharing of Sensitive Information (PPSSI) [19], Secure
Anonymous Database Search (SADS) [55] and Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [15], a
data owner would like to allow a client to search their database without revealing their data.
This model is less common seeks to hide the database contents from the querying party [49].
Different contexts require different query outcomes. For instance, a private search protocol
can return the count of the number of times a value appears in a database, related content
to the query within the database, or a Boolean denoting the presence of a value in the
84
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database. The security guarantee needed in the context will vary based on the participants
in the scenario and the desired outcome of the protocol.
Private search has a variety of real-world applications. The data outsourcing model can
be used by law enforcement for cyber security, allowing an institution to store all sensitive
data in an encrypted form while allowing investigators to query the information [14]. If
this institution is reluctant to divulge the contents of their search, the data sharing model
would enable an investigator to perform a private query on an encrypted database. Similarly,
private search has applications in the realm of medical data, where legal restrictions such
as HIPAA combined with the sensitive identifying nature of the data make data privacy a
priority. For example, private search would enable a medical institution to let an outside
researcher query the medical information database for presence of some feature in order to
determine if they would like to proceed with the time-consuming process of applying to an
institutional review board (IRB) for access to that data. Private search also has application
in private medical information system protocols. An application of private search within a
Decision Tree classifier is provided in the next chapter, Chapter 7.
Raykova et al. implement what they call exact keyword match in the secure anonymous database search (SADS) setting. Their research focuses on searching for keywords
within documents. Therefore, their method has a strong focus on feature extraction and
natural language processing in order remove exact match requirements such as capitalization restrictions. The method requires the setup of a Bloom filter for each document in the
database, which is built from the encryptions of all words in the document. These Bloom
filters are then used in conjunction with encryption methods in order to perform private keyword search within the documents. The authors propose a variety of decision function and
feature extraction combination, each of which has varying success at locating all documents
containing a phrase and adaptable false positive and false negative thresholds. Databases
feature extraction time and query time are not discussed explicitly; query time is described
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as efficient.
Pappas et al. implement querying of protected data with partially trusted parties. Their
work focuses on secure document retrieval, and in the process implements an improvement on
the SADS system discussed in the previous paragraph. Their model sacrifices some privacy
for increased efficiency. Specifically, the authors allow partially trusted parties. Angel et
al. use fully homomorphic encryption in the private information retrieval model in order to
allow a Client to download a file from a Server without the Server knowing which file they
downloaded [3].
This chapter describes a method performing the data sharing method of third party
private search with a binary outcome denoting presence of an exact match. In this scenario,
a Database Owner has a private database which a Client wishes to privately query. Two
scenarios are examined. In the first scenario, a third party private search protocol takes
place between a Client and a Data Owner. This model has the advantage of performing more
quickly, and the disadvantage of requiring the Data Owner to store a cleartext database. The
second scenario takes place between a Client and a Server which is storing a Data Owner’s
encrypted database. While this protocol is less time-efficient, it has the sometimes necessary
advantage of storing the data only in encrypted form. The desired outcome in both models
is a Boolean value denoting presence (or lack of presence) of the queried value within the
database.
With higher security guarantees, a tradeoff between security and efficiency is often unavoidable [55]. Security relaxations are appropriate in some settings such as secure keyword
search within a database of documents discussed in the papers referenced above, but these
relaxations may not be appropriate when working with medical data due to the high level of
privacy required. The protocol proposed in this chapter does not implement any relaxation
of security requirements.
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Stronger security requirements lead to a higher implementation time than methods with
relaxed security requirements. However, implementations show that this scheme can be
implemented in an efficient manner for many applications. Specifically, security requirements
are kept strong due to potential applications in computational medicine, such as the work
in Chapter 7.

6.2

Model

In the unencrypted setting, the Database Owner does not learn the Client’s value. This
setting is seen in Figure 6.1. A Client privately queries a database held by the Model
Owner, who privately provides a query response. The Client does not learn anything about
the contents of the database other than whether or not his value is contained within it.
The encrypted setting is the same as above, with the additional restriction that the Server
does not learn the querying party’s value or any unnecessary information about the Data
Owner’s information. This setting is seen in Figure 6.2. The Server can learn the number
of values within the database by observing the number of ciphertexts. The Data Owner can
hide the number of values in their database by randomly including different values. Instead of
learning the exact number of values in the database the Server learns the maximum number
of values which may be contained in the database.
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Figure 6.1: Third-Party Private Search

Figure 6.2: Third-Party Private Search via a Server
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Figure 6.3: Secure Modular Reduction

6.3

Building Blocks

The presented third-party private search protocol implements a number of cryptographic
techniques in order to carry out its operations. The TPPS protocol implements fully homomorphic encryption and secure modular reduction during execution. As FHE was detailed
in Chapter 2, this section begins by describing a secure modular reduction and finish by
defining the proposed TPPS protocol.

6.3.1

Secure Modular Reduction (SMR)

Secure modular reduction describes a class of algorithms which allow for secure evaluation
of modular reduction between two parties, one of whom possesses the modulus while the
other possesses an input value reduced. The security requirements vary based upon the
application. In the proposed protocol, secure modular reduction is implemented with both
a private modulus and a private input value.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the SMR protocol implemented within the proposed TPPS. Specif-
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ically, the Client provides a modulus M and the Server provides an input X. The Client
receives X (mod M ) without learning the value of X or revealing the value of M to the
Sender.

6.4

Third Party Private Search (TPPS) Protocol

The first version of the proposed protocol is implemented between the Client and the
Database Owner directly. Let D be a database with entries of at maximum q1 bits. Let
q2 be an integer such that q2 > q1 . The specifics of parameter selection for q1 and q2 are
discussed further in Section 6.9.
Algorithm 9 Third Party Private Search
Client Input: A q1 -bit integer x.
Database Owner Input: The database D, with entries of size at most q1 bits each.
Client Output: A Boolean b, where b = 1 if x ∈ D.
1:

The Client randomly selects a q2 -bit integer r and sends x = x + r to the Database
Owner.

2:

The Database Owner computes
y=

Y
d∈D

3:

(x − d).

The Client and Database Owner perform Secure Modular Reduction to return

y=y

(mod r)

to the Client. If y = 0, output 1; otherwise output 0.

Correct evaluation occurs with some probability depending on the parameters q1 and
q2 . The correctness of the above protocol is discussed in Section 6.6, and suggestions for

CHAPTER 6. THIRD PARTY PRIVATE SEARCH

91

parameter selection are presented in Section 6.9.

6.5

TPPS Over Encrypted Data

With the rise of cloud computing it is increasingly common for databases to be stored on
a Server. With sensitive data such as medical data the values will first be encrypted, then
stored. By using fully homomorphic encryption the Server can both store and perform operations over sensitive data. The next version of the proposed protocol is implemented between
the Client, the Database Owner, and a Server who handles the bulk of the computational
and storage tasks.

92

CHAPTER 6. THIRD PARTY PRIVATE SEARCH
Algorithm 10 Third Party Private Search Over Encrypted Database
Client Input: A q1 -bit integer x.
Server Input: The encrypted database JDK, encrypted under a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme.

Database Owner Input: The private encryption/decryption key, k, for the database D.
Client Output: A Boolean b, where b = 1 if x ∈ D.
1:

The Client randomly selects a q2 -bit integer r and sends x = x + r to the Database
Owner.

2:
3:

The Database Owner encrypts x under her private key and sends JxK to the Server.
The Server computes

JyK =

4:
5:

Y
d∈D

(JxK − JdK) =

t

Y
d∈D

|

(x − d)

and sends JyK to the Database Owner.
The Database Owner decrypts JyK to obtain y.
The Client and Database Owner perform Secure Modular Reduction to return

y=y

(mod r)

to the Client. If y = 0, output 1; otherwise output 0.
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Correctness

In the above protocol, if a value is present in the database, then 1 is guaranteed to be
returned. This is because the product

y=

Y
d∈D

=

Y
d∈D

(x − d)
(x + r − d)

contains the term x + r − x for some d = x ∈ D, and yields rP for some integer value P .
Because of this, rP (mod r) will always yield 1, and the Client will receive a true positive.
On the other hand, it is quite possible for a false positive value to be returned. If x 6∈ D
the product y may still be divisible by r. While requiring r to be a prime could resolve this
issue, it would introduce an unacceptable security flaw. The Database Owner could simply
find the closest prime numbers to the value sent by the Client in order to determine a small
set of candidates for the Client’s original value. Therefore, r is allowed to be uniformly
random, and in Section 6.8, we provide simulation results and suggestions for parameter
sizes to minimize the likelihood of a false positive occurring.

6.7

Security

Security for the proposed protocol is examined in the honest-but-curious model. Because
the goal of the protocol is data sharing, it is necessary that some information will be leaked
during execution of the protocol. Therefore, we discuss security of the protocol as well as
what restrictions must be put in place to avoid too much information being shared. How
much information is “too much” will depend on the setting. In the proposed setting, the
information which is shared with the Client and the Server is the size of the Database. The
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Data Owner should place a limit on the number of queries a single Client is able to execute
based on the maximum number of values contained in the database she wishes for the Client
to be able to receive. On the other hand, the Data Owner does not learn what values the
Client queries for within the database, but does learn the number of queries made by the
Client.
The security of the Client’s original value x is protected by the one-time pad r. Because
r is a uniformly random q2 -bit value, the value x + r will appear random as long as x + r is
still q2 -bits. As q2  q1 , this is a rare scenario that can easily be checked for and avoided
during computation.
In Algorithm 9, the Server maintains access to the encrypted database. The security
of the database therefore depends on the security of the encryption implemented. The
suggested scheme, the GKS scheme [36], is secure against a ciphertext-only attack and hence
satisfies the security requirements of the protocol. In both protocols, the Client never has
direct access to the database in any form. All the Client receives is the value ȳ at the end
of the protocol. The privacy of this value depends on the security of the Secure Modular
Reduction protocol. The SMR protocol suggested in Section 6.8 is secure in the honest-butcurious model.

6.8

Implementation

Implementation requires selection of SMR and FHE protocols that satisfy the necessary
security requirements. Below we provide an overview of the selected protocols.

6.8.1

Secure Modular Reduction

The selected SMR protocol [65] implements the Paillier cryptosystem [48], a partially homomorphic encryption scheme. Let JcKP denote encryption of a value c under Paillier. This
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scheme satisfies the properties that
• Jc1 KP · Jc2 KP = Jc1 ⊗ c2 KP
• JcKaP = JacKP
for all c1 , c2 and a.
In this protocol the Client possesses the private modulus b while the Server has the
private value a. The Server receives a (mod b) without learning the value of b or revealing
the value of a.
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Algorithm 11 Secure Modular Reduction [65]
Client Input: An integer b.
Server Input: An integer a.
Client Output: a mod b.
1:

The Client generates the public key, secret key pair for Paillier encryption and shares
the public key with the Server.

2:
3:

The Client sends JbKP to the Server.
$

$

The Server chooses rd ←
− (log2 N −1−log2 a) and rm ←
− log2 a-bit integers, and computes
JrKP = JbKrPd · Jrm KP = Jrd b + rm KP . It then sends
JzKP = JaKP · JrKP = Ja + rKP
to the Client

4:
5:

The Client computes zb = z (mod d) and sends JzbKP to the Server.
The Server computes

JabKP = JzbKP · Jrm K−1
P = Jzb − rm KP
and sends to the Client.
6:

The Client decrypts to retrieve ab = a mod b.

6.8.2

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

The FHE scheme implemented within the protocol is the private-key GKS scheme. For more
information on this scheme see Chapter 2.
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Minimization of Prediction Error

In order to estimate the prediction error of the proposed protocol, a series of Monte Carlo
method based experiments were implemented. The Monte Carlo method is a general term
to describe the use of repeated random sampling in order to solve a problem that may or
may not be deterministic. These experiments repeatedly computed the product

y=

Y
d∈D

(x + r − d)

for a randomly generated databases D, random q2 -bit integers r, and random q1 -bit integers
x. Observe that this corresponds to the product computed by the database owner in Algorithms 9 and 10. In these protocols, if y (mod r) = 0, then the protocol outputs 1, telling
the Client that his value is contained in the database. The Monte Carlo experiments return 1
if y (mod r) = 0 and return 0 otherwise. These responses are counted as true positives, true
negatives, false positives, or false negatives based on whether or not x ∈ D. For instance, if
x 6∈ D but y (mod r) = 0, the response is counted as a false positive.
Each experiment consisted of 200, 000 queries given a fixed q1 and q2 for a database
containing 10 values. A method for extension to larger databases is presented in Section
6.10.
Let Q1 denote the set of all q1 -bit numbers. In each iteration of the experiment two
values are randomly generated: a q1 -bit number, b, and a q2 -bit value, r. The first 100, 000
iterations randomly generate the values a1 , . . . , an from the set Q1 r {b}, the set of all q1
bit numbers not containing b. The second 100, 000 iterations assign a1 = b and randomly
generate a2 , a3 , . . . , an from Q1 . These restrictions are imposed in order to ensure that exactly
half of the data should yield a positive classification and half a negative classification for an
evenly distributed data set. The experiment was run for values 2 ≤ q1 ≤ 17, 3 < q2 ≤ 50,
and n = 10. This fixed size for n was chosen with the use of the large database extension
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Figure 6.4: The observed fallout for n = 10.
method of Section 6.10 in mind. The full table of results from the Monte Carlo experiments
are available in Appendix A.
Figure 6.4 shows a series of results of this experiment for a selection of values of q1 . The
x-axis on each plot represents value of q2 , while the y-axis denotes the resulting fallout from
the Monte Carlo experiments. Recall that fallout is defined as

fallout =

# false positives
.
# false positives + # true negatives

The proposed method has no false negatives, meaning its true positive rate is 100%. In order
to avoid false positives, the value of the fallout must be minimized.
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There are two methods of approaching selection of q2 given q1 . The first method is to
take a large value for q2 ; however, depending on computational restraints, this could lead
to expensive operations. Therefore, a smaller value may be taken for q2 and the experiment
repeated the requisite number of times in order to minimize the fallout to below the desired
threshold.

6.10

Large Database Extension

When a database is large, the value of the products computed in Algorithms 9 and 10 could
be come prohibitively large. The following extension protocol is proposed for databases with
a large number of entries.

6.10.1

Unencrypted Model

In the unencrypted model, a large database with n elements is handled by splitting it into
k distinct sub-databases, each containing up to m elements from the original database.
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Algorithm 12 Third-Party Private Search on Large Database
Client Input: A value x.
Database Owner Input: A database D with n entries, an integer parameter m.
Client Output: A Boolean b, where b = 1 if x ∈ D.
1:

The Database Owner randomly shuffles her database and splits it into k distinct subdatabases D1 through Dk , each containing (up to) m entries.

2:

The Client randomly selects a q2 -bit integer r and sends x = x + r to the Database
Owner.

3:
4:

for i from 1 to k do
The Database Owner computes yi =

5:

end for

6:

for i from 1 to k do

7:

Q

d∈Dk (x

− d).

The Client and Database Owner perform Secure Modular Reduction to return yi = y
(mod r) to the Client. If yi = 0, set bi = 1; otherwise set bi = 0.

8:

end for

9:

Client outputs b =

Pk

i=1 bi .

Note that the first for loop in lines 3–5 contains instructions carried out only by the
Database Owner. The second for loop in lines 6–8 calls a sub-protocol which requires
communication between the Database Owner and the Client. The computation carried
out up to that second for loop is analogous to the computation carried out in the original
protocol, albeit with smaller integer values due to the smaller number of multiplication
operations performed. Extra time required by this protocol will occur during the required
communication for Secure Modular Reduction. However, implementing the protocol in this
model allows for implementation with large databases, a clear advantage.
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Encrypted Model

In the encrypted setting, where private search is performed over an encrypted database,
the method of model extension is almost the same as the unencrypted case. However, the
structure of the encrypted data can be used advantageously via Single-Instruction Multiple
Data (SIMD) instructions. Specifically, under the default parameters of the GKS encryption
scheme with n = 5, a maximum of 2n = 32 values may be simultaneously encoded and
encrypted in a single ciphertext.
Assume a Database Owner has a database containing n elements. During encryption of
the database the Database Owner encrypts the maximum number of values within a single
data point that SIMD allows. Say there are n0 resulting ciphertexts. The Server stores these
n0 values in ciphertext form. During execution of the extended protocol, the Server randomly
splits these n0 values into subsets via the extension method above.
The number of calls to the Secure Modular Reduction protocol is not reduced, and must
be performed for each sub-database as well as each SIMD slot. The described method provides a great boost in computation speed due to the SIMD slots as homomorphic multiplication is an expensive operation. With the default parameters of the GKS scheme containing
32 slots, the number of homomorphic multiplication operations required to be performed is
divided by 32.

6.11

Evaluation

Tests were performed to determine the performance of the proposed protocol given varying
sizes of databases in both the encrypted and unencrypted setting. Experiments were run on
a MacBook Pro with a 2.3 GHz processor and 16 GB memory. Table 6.1 shows the execution
time of the private search extension protocol. Results are given for a wide range of database
sizes, with the time in seconds for execution in the encrypted and the unencrypted settings.
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Dataset Size
Time (s)

160

320

640

960

1280

1600

Unenc.

0.016

0.031

0.063

0.098

0.128

0.170

Enc.

0.290

0.454

0.821

1.203

1.645

1.958

2560

5120

7680

10240

12800

15360

Unenc.

0.248

0.789

0.994

1.023

1.268

1.554

Enc.

3.184

6.150

9.332

12.400

15.401

18.629

Dataset Size
Time (s)

Table 6.1: Execution Time, Private Search Extension
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Figure 6.5: Execution Time, Private Search Extension
Figure 6.5 provides a visual comparison of encrypted versus unencrypted computation
times. As expected, the time taken per protocol is linear with respect to the size of the
database. Speeds in the unencrypted model took place in below half a second for small
database sizes, and below two seconds for databases with 15, 360 elements. Computation in
the encrypted model was more computationally intensive and performed in under 1 second
for small database sizes, and under 20 seconds for large databases. All experiments resulted
in a 100% true negative rate and false negative rate, meaning there were no false positives for
false negatives. This is of great importance for medical applications, where a false positive
can result in a misdiagnosis and a false negative could result in a crucially missed diagnosis.
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Computational Bottlenecks
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Computation time of Algorithm 12 is determined by a number of factors. In particular, a
major computational bottleneck will be homomorphic multiplication operations and communication costs.
Consider a database D with n entries in the unencrypted model. Say this database is
split into a collection of smaller databases, each with m entries. Without loss of generality,
consider databases where the size n is a multiple of m, as this will provide an upper bound
on computation. This results in a total of k = n/m sub-databases. In the first for loop in
lines 3 − 5, the Database Owner computes the product
yi =

Y
d∈Dk

(x − d),

where each product yi is computed via d multiplication operations. Therefore, the number
of multiplications carried out is bounded by k · m = n/m · m = n.
The second for loop in lines 6 − 8 carries out Secure Modular Reduction k times. During
Secure Modular Reduction, seen in Algorithm 11, the Client communicates with the Server
2 times and the Server communicates with the Client 2 times. This would imply that a total
of 4 · k communications are required during this for loop. However, communication cost can
be dramatically reduced by breaking up the steps along communication.
In particular, a series of k Secure Modular Reductions can be carried out in only 4 total
communications between the Client and Server. The Client first generates a single public
key, private key pair for Paillier, then encrypts all k values which are to be reduced under the
public key. The Client sends all k of these encrypted values to the Server in one message.
The Server then performs Step 3 of Algorithm 11 on all values received, and sends all k
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resulting values to the Client in one message. Steps 4 and 5 proceed similarly, where the
Client and Server perform all k computations locally and send k results simultaneously.
This method does not reduce the local computation required by the Client and the
Server. It does, however, greatly reduce communication costs. All together, TPPS over a
large database in the unencrypted model requires at most n multiplication operations and 5
communications between the Database Owner and the Client.
In the encrypted model, further optimization is possible. In particular, consider an
implementation of SIMD where ` database elements may be encoded simultaneously. Then,
a sub-database containing m ciphertexts will in fact contain as many as m · ` database
elements. Without loss of generality assume there is a database D of size n, where n is
divisible by m · `, in order to provide an upper bound on multiplication costs. Then, splitting
D into sub-databases each containing m ciphertexts will result in

k=

n
m·`

sub-databases. Therefore, homomorphic multiplication is carried out only k · m = n/` times.
Communication costs can be minimized in the encrypted case in the same way there were
minimized in the unencrypted case. This method requires one communication between the
Database Owner and the Server, and one communication between the Server and Database
Owner. TPPS over a large database in the encrypted model therefore requires n/` homomorphic multiplication operations and 7 communications between Database Owner, Client,
and Server.

6.12.2

Comparison

Other research that has focused on private document retrieval is not directly comparable.
Reported times include costly preprocessing of text document databases as well as file trans-
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fer time costs. Raykova et al. provide results on their secure anonymous database search
protocol, which returns a list of documents containing a queried keyword, by listing the
number of document matches found for a variety of query and aggregate search function
configurations [55]. This model presents a variable number of false negatives based upon the
aggregate search function configuration implemented during construction of the documents’
Bloom filters.
Private information retrieval carried out by Angel et al. is evaluated using Microsoft
Azure’s powerful data centers [3]. The PIR servers are equipped with 16-core 3.6 GHz
processors with 112 GB of memory, and the Client’s servers are equipped with 16-core 2.4
GHz processors and 32 GB of memory. The majority of computation occurred on the PIR
server, and the goal of the protocol is to return to the Client the documents matching the
Client’s query.
Pappas et al. also perform experiments on a private database retrieval protocol, where
the Client seeks to download files containing a keyword [49]. They perform queries on a
data set containing 5, 000 keywords. They report the initial query response time, where
the Client receives the set of document IDs containing a queried keyword, as well as the
time for the entire document retrieval protocol. The initial query returning document IDs
containing a keyword occurs as fast as under 50 milliseconds for a database containing 50, 000
keywords. The protocol achieves a hit ratio of approximately 90% for retrieval of document
IDs containing the queried keyword. However, these results do not apply to the goal of
database membership queries explored in this chapter, as a high occurrence of false positives
or false negatives is unacceptable.
Khedr et al. perform what they call secure multiple keyword search [41]. This setting is
similar to the setting explored in this chapter. Specifically, the authors explore the scenario
where a Client wishes to query a text file for the presence of a keyword. The authors provide
timing results for partially secure database search, where the Client’s query is not hidden
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but the database itself is hidden, and later for a fully secure database search, where both
the Client’s query and the database values are hidden, using their proposed FHE scheme as
well as IBM’s HElib [59]. The authors run their experiments on a GPU with 2, 048 CUDA
cores with 4 GB of memory. Files containing 140 words are queried in approximately 10
seconds using the authors’ proposed scheme as a platform within their multiple keyword
search protocol, while queries running via HElib as a platform take over 1, 000 seconds to
query a file of the same size. The results given in Table 6.1 show significant improvement
over this performance.

6.13

Conclusions

This chapter provides results on a third party private search protocol which performs private
membership queries between a Client and Database Owner, with or without an intermediary
Server storing the database in encrypted form. Results show that large databases can be
queried quickly and accurately using the proposed method. Future work could focus on
technical improvements leading to faster performance or extension to a SADS scheme with
a high hit ratio.
This functionality has applications in a variety of fields. A potential application in
the medical field is to allow researchers to privately query a database owned by another
institution. In this scenario, the researchers could query the database to determine if it
contains information of interest to them without the institution learning their query. Email
could be monitored for spam keywords without compromising the privacy of a user’s emails.
Further applications lie in the field of law enforcement, where confidential data could be
stored protected in encrypted format while maintaining the utility to allow investigators to
query the data. For instance, a list of known offenders could be queried for the presence of
a suspect by an investigator who cannot directly access the names of people on the list, all
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without the investigator compromising the privacy of the suspect.
In the next chapter, the presented third party private search protocol is used for classification of real medical data via decision tree models.

Chapter 7
Privacy-Preserving Decision Tree
Classification
7.1

Introduction

Binary decision trees are a method of classification that can be represented in a simple diagram by interior decision nodes and terminal leaf nodes. The leaf nodes at the bottom of
the tree provide the final classification for a data point. Due to the representation as a tree
structure, decision trees are easily to interpret and understand. This ease of interpretability
is one clear advantage of using decision trees. In fact, this method is favored among scientists in the medical community as it is easy to visualize and it “mimics the way a doctor
thinks” by “stratify[ing] the population into strata of high and low outcome, on the basis
of patient characteristics” [39]. Due to its medical utility, a privacy-preserving classification
protocol using Classification and Regression Trees (CART) is presented in this chapter, and
experiments on a real-world medical data set are performed efficiently.
The primary contribution in this chapter is the construction of a privacy-preserving
decision tree classifier. This protocol uses a variety of cryptographic primitives in order to
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construct private decision tree classification. It utilizes third party private search protocol,
fully homomorphic encryption, secure modular reduction, and a primitive called oblivious
transfer. This chapter begins with discussion of the background and methods required for
these primitives and related work in the field in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. Sections 7.4 and 7.5
present the proposed protocol and discusses its security. Sections 7.6, 7.8, and 7.9 discuss
implementation of the protocol and classification results on a real-world medical data set.

7.2

Classification and Regression Tree (CART)

The Classification and Regression Tree method, or CART, is a tree-based implementation
of supervised learning for classification and regression [12]. Like Naive Bayes, this method
has the advantage of being both conceptually simple and robust.
A tree-based method operates by choos-
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Figure 7.1: Binary data in R2 .

toy data points with binary classifications
in a two-dimensional subspace of R2 on axes
X1 and X2 . Each of these regions is then
assigned a corresponding class based on a
majority vote within the region. In Figure
7.6, the sub-figure 7.2 shows the region after

a sequence of binary splits into 6 final regions. Sub-figure 7.3 gives the binary tree which
represents these splits. Sub-figure 7.4 shows the sub-regions with the toy data points and
sub-figure 7.5 shows the classification tree resulting from a majority vote of classes points
within the sub-region.
While this example is for data points in R2 , the concept applies to Z2 or categorical-
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valued feature vectors with more than two classes. While it is difficult to visualize these
binary partitions in M -dimensional space, the binary tree representation of the partitions
remains straightforward to draw as a binary tree in any number of dimensions.

7.2.1

Growing Classification Trees

The exposition below follows that of Hastie [39] and uses data with d features from Rd which
lies in a discrete set of c classes G = {G1 , . . . , Gc }. The method can be easily extended to
integer-valued and categorical data points. Consider p input data points, each of the form
(X, Gi ) where X = (X1 , . . . , Xd ) ∈ Rd . Training determines a sequence of binary partitions
that minimize the amount of error present in the final classification contained in each leaf.
A greedy algorithm is implemented in order to split the input space via binary partitions
in an efficient manner. This greedy algorithm will minimize the classification error in each
region at each step.
For the first split, a dimension, or splitting variable, j, and a split point s, are chosen
in order to minimize the classification error in each of the two resulting regions based on a
majority vote. Formally the two regions are defined by

R(j, s) = {X : Xj ≤ s}
R0 (j, s) = {X : Xj > s}
and the goal is to minimize the classification error over the variables j and s. Let Err(R(j, s))
and Err(R0 (j, s)) represent the measure of node impurity (e.g. misclassification error, Gini
index) in R(j, s) and R0 (j, s), respectively. The equation

min [Err(R(j, s)) + Err(R0 (j, s))]
j,s
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Figure 7.6: The CART method
is minimized by testing all potential values for the splitting point s. This algorithm can be
carried out efficiently [39].
This process is carried out in an iterative manner on each sub-region. Determining when
to stop involves finding a balance between a tree that is too large and over fits to the data
and a tree that is too small and under fits the data. One method is to grow the tree until
each region contains only η data vectors then apply pruning methods such as cost-complexity
pruning to shrink the tree. In this case, η is called the minimum node size.
Pruning is carried out follows. First an initial tree T0 is grown until each region contains at
most η data vectors. Say there are K leaf nodes determining regions Rk ⊂ Rd for 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
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Let T denote a subtree T ⊆ T0 and define
Nk = #{X ∈ Rk },
the number of data vectors in Rk , and

pk` =

1 X
I(Gi = `),
Nk X∈Rk

the proportion of class ` vectors in region Rk . There are several potential measures of node
impurity:
• The classification error given by
1 − pk` .
• The Gini impurity given by

c
X
`=1

• The entropy given by
−

(1 − pk` ).

c
X

pk` log pk` .

`=1

Gini impurity and entropy are most often used as measures of node impurity during the tree
growing stage while the misclassification error is most often used during the pruning phase
[39]. Denote the chosen measure of node impurity as Qk (T ). The cost complexity criterion

Cα (T ) =

|T |
X
k=1

Nk Qk (T ) + α|T |

is minimized for a tuning parameter α ≥ 0. When α = 0 the tree T = T0 , and T becomes
smaller as α becomes larger. A value for α which determines the unique smallest subtree
T minimizes the cost Cα (T ). This optimization problem has a global solution [39], and the
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final model is given by the tree resulting from minimizing the cost.

7.2.2

Classification of New Data Points

Consider a data point X with an unknown class. Classifying this data point using a trained
CART model consists of applying the condition in each node of the decision tree to X and
following the branches sequentially until a leaf node is reached. The class contained in this
leaf node is the class value assigned to X. The precise method of classification of new
data points via a trained decision tree implemented in the presented protocols is given in
Algorithm 13.

7.3

Methodologies

Moving from classification of new data points in the clear to private classification of new data
points requires hiding both the tree structure from the Client and hiding the Client’s data
input from the Model Owner. One approach converts a decision tree into its polynomial form
[6, 61]. Another approach converts a decision tree into a complete binary tree and performs
a randomization procedure. These two approaches are discussed below. After this, oblivious
transfer is introduced, as it will be a necessary step within the proposed private decision
tree classification protocol.

7.3.1

Randomizing Trees

Methods which first convert a tree into a polynomial form run in the public-key setting
between a Client, Server, and Model Owner. Consider a decision tree with n decision nodes.
Each of these notes has a binary output. Denote the binary output of each node for some
input as b1 , b2 , . . . , bn . Let c1 , c2 , . . . , cn denote the corresponding leaf nodes, containing
a binary classification value. A recursive procedure allows for efficient computation of a
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polynomial P (b1 , b2 , . . . , bn , c1 , c2 , . . . , cn ) such that the output of P corresponds to the class
of the input value for which the decision nodes were evaluated [6]. The methods of Bost et al.
[6] allow for private classification to occur under this model using two encryption schemes,
the Quadratic Reciprocity (QR) scheme [34] and a public-key FHE scheme. For private
classification, the Client holds the FHE private key and the Model Owner holds the QR
key. The Client computes the values [bi ]QR for i from 1 to n using some privacy-preserving
protocol, encrypts these (encrypted) values via FHE, and sends them to the Model Owner.
The Model Owner then evaluates the polynomial P , encrypted under both QR then FHE.
The authors then provide a method for the Client to receive the output of this function
without revealing the output to the Model Owner.
These protocols all generally follow the broad steps, a modification on the work of Bost
et al. [6].
1:

The Client publishes a public key for some public-key encryption scheme.

2:

The Model Owner encrypts the polynomial form P of a decision tree T and stores this
encryption on the Server.

3:

The Client and Model Owner perform a series of privacy-preserving protocols in order to
determine the binary output of the tree on each node. In this setting, privacy-preserving
means that the Client does not directly learn the evaluation of his data point on each
node, and the Model Owner does not learn the Client’s data point.

4:

The Server evaluates the polynomial over the data point using fully homomorphic encryption [41, 61] or some other method [6].

5:

The Client decrypts the output to receive his classification.
Khedr et al. perform private decision tree classification using this polynomial repre-

sentation paradigm [41]. Their protocol allows for implementation of classification via the
polynomial form of a binary decision tree and uses public-key fully homomorphic encryption
for classification in place of the methods of Bost et al. [6]. Sun et al. also present a private
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Figure 7.7: The completion (right) of a binary tree (left).
decision tree methodology also based on polynomial forms of trees using public-key fully
homomorphic encryption [61].
In the private key setting, both parties are unable to encrypt their data under a public
key, and another method is necessary

7.3.2

Complete Tree Randomization

The methodology presented by Wu et al. [68] of complete binary tree randomization does not
require a polynomial representation of a tree. In this model, “dummy” nodes are introduced
into a tree in order to impose a uniform depth upon its structure.
The dummy nodes contain random evaluations with binary output, where each response
leads to the same outcome. When privatization of the tree structure is not a goal, this
structure is redundant. However, with a complete binary tree, regardless of the outcome on
individual nodes any data point will require the same number of evaluations to compute.
This is an important aspect of a Model Owner ultimately hiding the tree structure from a
Client. An example of a completion of a binary tree is shown in Figure 7.7. The yellow
decision nodes contain random binary evaluation functions, and the leaf nodes contain the
class corresponding to the assigned class in the original tree on the left.
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The authors describe a tree randomization procedure in which a complete tree is hidden
via by randomly permuting the nodes of a tree T to obtain an equivalent tree T 0 [68]. An
equivalent tree is a tree with the same depth and the same classification output for every
data point, but with a different classification path within the tree. An equivalent tree is
created by randomly flipping the outcome of the binary decision function at each node.
Their algorithm proceeds as follows, with input of a tree T and output of a randomized tree
T 0 . The tree T contains n leaf nodes ti
1:

Initialize T 0 = T .

2:

Randomly choose s = (s1 , . . . , sn ) ∈ {0, 1}n .

3:

For i from 1 to n, if si = 1 then negate the decision function on the node t0i of the tree
T 0 and swap the subtrees originating at the left and right child nodes.

4:

Re-order the node indexes and output T 0 .
And example of a binary tree which has been negated on the first node is available in

Figure 7.8.

7.3.3

Oblivious Transfer

Originally introduced by Rabin in 1981, oblivious transfer was first described as an RSAbased cryptographic primitive which allowed a Receiver to obtain a message from a Sender
with probability of 0.5 without the Sender knowing whether or not the value was received
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Figure 7.9: 1-of-2 Oblivious Transfer
[53]. In the years since, 1-of-2 oblivious transfer has developed into a two-party cryptographic primitive which allows a receiving party to obtain exactly one value out of two
values sent by the sending party without revealing to the sender her choice. Figure 7.9 provides a visualization of the usual model. The Sender and Receiver perform a key generation
algorithm which includes the Receiver’s choice of index. The sender then encrypts the two
values based on these keys and sends them to the Receiver. Decryption reveals the value
associated with the index selected during the key generation algorithm while decrypting the
other value yields an output which appears random to the Receiver, effectively masking its
true value from her.
In a 1-of-n oblivious transfer protocol, the Sender has values b1 , b2 , . . . , bn and the Receiver
has chosen an index i. The Sender would like to share bi with the Receiver without revealing
any of the other values to her. The Receiver wishes to hide her index from the Sender.
The protocol presented for third-party private search implements a 1-of-n oblivious transfer
protocol.
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Tree Representation and Decision Tree Classification

A complete binary decision tree can be represented in the following manner. A complete
binary decision tree D is represented as a collection of k nodes, D = {d1 , d2 , . . . , dk }. A tree
with depth m has 2m − 1 nodes. For a tree with depth m, nodes with indexes from 1 to
2m−1 − 1 are decision nodes and nodes with indexes from 2m−1 to 2m − 1 are leaf nodes.
Determine child nodes based on the binary representation of the index at the node. The
root node is assigned the index 1, which corresponds to the integer value 1. Its child nodes
are given by 10 and 11, corresponding to nodes 2 and 3, respectively. Node 10 is the child
node of 1 when the outcome on that node is negative, or 0; node 11 is the child node when
the outcome is positive, or 1. Figure 7.10 provides an example of a tree with depth d = 4.
The value inside of the node represents the node index in binary, and the value on each
arrow represents the binary decision outcome on that node.
To move from decision node to its child node, evaluate the node on the input data point
and concatenate the decision to the binary representation of the node index. Convert back
to decimal to retrieve the node index number. To move from a child node to its root node,
dissociate the last value from the binary representation of the index. For example, the parent
node of 1011 is 101.
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Figure 7.10: Binary Tree Node Assignment
These values can also be represented in base 10. Let I be the index of a node. Then, the
index of its parent node is given by

Parent(I) = bI/2c.
The indexes of its child nodes are given by

LeftChild(I) = 2I
RightChild(I) = 2I + 1.

The leaf node associated with a data point may be reached using its binary representation
via the following algorithm.
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Algorithm 13 Decision Tree Classification

Input: A decision tree T in complete binary tree form with n nodes and depth m, and a
data point X to be classified via T . Let bI denote the binary evaluation output of X on the
tree node with index I.
Output: The index of the leaf node containing the classification of X.
1:

I=1

. Initialize the node index to 1.

2:

J =None

. Initialize an empty output J.

3:

for i from 1 to m do

4:

J = JkbI .

5:

I = 2I + bI .

6:

end for

7:

Output J.

7.5

. Operator k denotes concatenation.

Private Decision Tree Classification Protocol

Consider a Client, C, a Data Model Owner, D, and a Server, S. First, consider a general
overview without implementing privacy-preserving measures. The Data Model Owner trains
a binary decision tree, T , under the CART algorithm. This tree is presented as a complete
tree of depth n contains of 2n − 1 nodes with index labeling as outlined above. Some of these
nodes may be dummy nodes. Denote each decision node by ti with corresponding decision
function fi for i from 1 to 2n−1 − 1. The leaf nodes are denoted by ti with class assignment
ci for i from 2n−1 to 2n − 1. The The Model Owner stores this tree on the Server. The Client
has a data point with d features,

X = (X1 , X2 , . . . , Xd ).
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The Client wishes to classify his data point using the Model Owner’s tree. The Client
computes the binary decision function fi on each decision node ti in order to determine his
tree path, then retrieves the class assignment Gi which corresponds to that path.
Each step in this procedure must be randomized. First, the tree T must be replaced
with an equivalent randomized tree T 0 . Furthermore, the Client needs a privacy-preserving
method of determining his path in the randomized tree. Note that the Client must query
every node in the tree – otherwise, the Server can determine the path he followed based on
his queries, and a colluding Server and Model Owner could then determine his classification.
The proposed protocol implements third-party private search in order to perform classification. Recall that in medical applications it is common for features to take on only a
discrete set of values. If the value is some continuous measurement, it can be quantized to
take on only some discrete set of values.
This representation of a feature as a discrete set of possible values is used in order to
implement third-party private search for node evaluation. Let y be some feature which can
take on ` discrete values which are assigned numbers the numbers 1 to `. Say a decision
function splits this feature at k – all values greater than or equal to k result in True, while
all values less than k result in False. Evaluation of this decision function may be reduced
to set membership. The decision function can be represented by the set {k, k + 1, . . . , `},
and a True output occurs for all values which occur within the set.
Once the Client has determined the index of his classification on the randomized tree,
he retrieves his final classification by implementing an oblivious transfer protocol with the
Model Owner. Algorithm 14 carries out this private decision tree classification evaluation.
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Algorithm 14 Private Decision Tree Classification
Client Input: An n-tuple of q1 -bit integers x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ).
Model Owner Input: The trained decision tree D.
Client Output: The assigned class of x based on the decision tree D.
1:

The Client performs D0 =RandomizeTree(D).

2:

Initialize variable y =’1’.

3:

for Node i in D0 do

4:

Compute bi =Node(x, D, i)

. See Algorithm 16.

. See Algorithm 15.

5:

end for

6:

Perform Oblivious Transfer to reveal the classification value at the tree node determined
in the loop above.

The method for performing private node evaluation using third-party private search is
outlined in Algorithm 15.

7.5.1

Private Node Evaluation

The Client must compute the binary output of the decision function on each node for his
input data point. In order to carry this out, the Client implements a version of the Third
Party Private Search (TPPS) protocol described Algorithm 9 in Chapter 6.
While in the previous chapter the Client was able to perform TPPS within a data set for
one value, the Client in this scenario has d values corresponding to the d features used within
the model. An oblivious transfer protocol is implemented within the TPPS framework in
order to mask which feature the Model Owner evaluates over during execution. This method
of oblivious transfer with TPPS is described in Algorithm 15 below.
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Algorithm 15 Private Node Evaluation Protocol
Client Input: An n-tuple of q1 -bit integers x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ).
Model Owner Input: The index of the feature at the node, I, and the database for that
node, D.
Client Output: 1 if xI ∈ D, 0 if xI 6∈ D.
1:

The Client randomly selects a log2 (q2 )-bit integer, r, according to the parameters of the
TPPS protocol.

2:

The Client computes

x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) = (x1 + r, x2 + r, . . . , xn + r).
3:

The Client and the Model Owner perform an OT extension protocol in order to transfer
the value xI from the Model Owner to the Client, where I ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is the index
of the decision variable on the node.

4:

The Client and Model Owner perform a Third-Party Private Search protocol to determine
whether xI ∈ D. If xI ∈ D, the client outputs 1; otherwise, the client outputs 0.
The private decision tree protocol in Algorithm 14 carries out Algorithm 15 to determine

the binary output on each node. This binary output is used for the final classification of the
Client’s data point.

7.6

Security

The desired security is that the Client learns nothing about the Model Owner’s learned
model, the Model Owner learns no information about the Client’s data point, and the Server
learns no information about either party’s private data.
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Implementation

The following methods were used in order to implement the Private Decision Tree Evaluation
protocol.

7.7.1

Tree Randomization

Tree randomization is implemented via the following, Algorithm 16. This algorithm proceeds
by first generating an n-tuple of random bits, bi , denoting whether a nodes decision will be
reversed or not. If the node is reversed, the subtrees stemming from the children nodes are
swapped. This differs from the protocol described in Section 7.3.2 in several small ways.
Instead of copying the tree, randomizing, then re-indexing the output tree, the algorithm
below computes a permutation π on the indexes of the nodes in T such that T 0 = π(T ) is a
randomized version of T . Because of this difference in approach, the same n-tuple of random
bits would result in different randomized tree outputs under the two algorithms. However,
both ultimately result in an efficiently computed randomized tree.
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Algorithm 16 Tree Randomization (adapted from [68])
Input: A decision tree T in complete binary tree form with n nodes and depth m.
Output: A randomized decision tree T 0 in complete binary tree form.
1:

Generate a random permutation π(n).

2:

Generate an n-tuple of random bits, b = {bi }.

3:

for i from 1 to n do

4:

if bi = 1 then

5:

d = log2 (i)

6:

for j from 1 to m − d + 1 do

7:

for k from 0 to 2j−1 do

8:

Switch the value of π(i · 2j + k − 1) with the value of π(i · 2j − k + 2j−1 − 1).

9:

end for

10:

end for

11:

end if

12:

end for

13:

for i from 1 to n do

14:
15:

. Create the randomized tree via the permutation π.

T 0 (i) = T (π(i)).
end for

7.7.2

Oblivious Transfer

A protocol, simply called “The Simplest Protocol for Oblivious Transfer,” is implemented in
our experiments [16]. This is a group-based 1-of-n oblivious transfer protocol, the algorithm
for which is provided below in Algorithm 17. In this setting, Alice is the Receiver in Figure
7.9 and Bob is the Sender.
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Algorithm 17 1-of-n Oblivious Transfer [16]
Sender Input:
Receiver Input: The trained decision tree D.
Receiver Output: The assigned class of x based on the decision tree D.
1:

The Sender and Receiver share randomly generated public keys p (prime) and g ∈ Zp
and agree upon a hash function H.
$

2:

The Sender selects b ←
− Zp and sends B = g b to the Receiver.

3:

The Receiver selects a ←
− Zp and sends A = B I g a = g bI+a to the Sender for her choice

$

of I ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
4:

The Sender computes the keys ki = (A/B i )b = g (I−i)b

5:

The Receiver computes the key k = B a = g ab .

6:

The Sender sends ei = Mi ⊕ H(ki ) to the Receiver for i = 1 to n.

7:

The Receiver computes MI = eI ⊕ H(k).

7.8

2 +ab

for i = 1 to n.

Evaluation

Decision trees were trained using Python 3 with 10-fold cross validation. Random oversampling was implemented during training on the positive classification set, as these were less
represented in the overall data set. Trees were limited to a maximum depth of 5, a minimum
of 3 samples per split, and a minimum of 3 samples per leaf. Gini impurity was used to
measure the quality of the split during training.
The protocol was implemented in C++ on a Windows 7 machine with a 3.40Ghz processor and 32.0GB memory using the GNU MP Bignum Library [62] for arbitrary precision
arithmetic, Chou and Orlandi’s “Simplest OT Extension” protocol [16], Veugen’s secure
modular reduction protocol [65], and the GKS private-key FHE scheme [36].
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Accuracy

Sensitivity

Specificity

Precision

NPV

F1-score

Mean

0.96628

0.96172

0.97500

0.98699

0.93487

0.97367

Stand. Dev.

0.02192

0.03010

0.05270

0.02700

0.04875

0.01695

Table 7.1: Decision Tree Classification Results
Time (s)
Unencrypted, Not Private

0.00001

Encrypted

0.91251

Table 7.2: Decision Tree Classification Time
Training and testing took place under 10-fold cross validation. The results are available
in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2. The results in Table 7.1 show that the decision tree classifier
outperforms the Naive Bayes classifier of Chapter 5 in terms of performance over this data
set. The results in Table 7.2 show that this classifier takes slightly longer than the Naive
Bayes classifier, however. Despite this, classification of an individual data point still is carried
out in less than one second on average on a tree with 32 decision nodes. These results show
that the proposed protocol can be fast and accurate for private classification within medical
applications.

7.9
7.9.1

Discussion
Computational Bottlenecks

The primary bottleneck during computation occurs due to the cost of homomorphic multiplication. During Algorithm 14, homomorphic multiplication is performed during node
evaluation on each node. In particular, if k is the maximum number of values any feature
of a data point X may take, then the number of homomorphic operations performed during
each node evaluation is bounded above by k. A tree with N nodes therefore requires at
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most n · K homomorphic multiplication operations. This bottleneck could be avoided by
implementing the protocol in the unencrypted third-party private search model discussed in
Chapter 6.
A bottleneck also occurs due to communication costs. During each node evaluation a
number of communications are performed. During Oblivious Transfer, the Client communicates with the Model Owner two times and the Model Owner communicates with the Client
one time. In addition to the communication cost of Oblivious Transfer, private node evaluation in Algorithm 15 requires 6 additional communications between the Client, Server, and
Model Owner in the encrypted model, and 4 communications in the unencrypted model.
Therefore on a tree with N nodes, communication must be performed 9 · N times in the
encrypted model and 6 · N times in the unencrypted model.
To speed up performance, it is important that the Model Owner perform pre-processing
on the data. Properly pre-processed data could result in a smaller tree, and therefore in a
faster classification time. In particular, feature selection should be implemented on the data
in order to reduce the dimensionality before training a learned model. Feature selection is
a powerful method to implement during model construction to improve the model’s performance by identifying only the most relevant features within the data [39]. Feature selection
can be carried out in a variety of ways, depending on the data set. Feature selection covers
a wide variety of algorithms which include filters, wrapper methods, and embedded methods
[37].

7.9.2

Comparison

Khedr et al. explain that their classifier should perform decision tree classification on a
tree with four nodes in approximately 3.477 milliseconds [41]. This is an estimate they
approximated based on the multiplication running time of their protocol, and no tests were
implemented. A full implementation of their protocol on a tree of comparable size would be
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necessary in order to provide a true comparison of results.
Wu et al. perform private decision tree classification on a tree with 12 decision nodes
in approximately 0.545 seconds [68]. Bost et al. perform decision tree classification using
encryption methods which are not fully homomorphic. They report average running times
on a 4 node tree of 1.579 seconds for the Client and 0.798 seconds for the Server, and on a
6 node tree they report running times of 2.297 seconds for the Client and 1.723 seconds for
the Server. The results in Table 7.2 show speedup over these times.

7.10

Conclusion

Third-party private search can be implemented in conjunction with various cryptographic
methods in order to perform efficient, private classification using classification trees. Future
work could extend this method to implement the large database variant of TPPS given in
Algorithm 12, as well as implementation of random forest.

Chapter 8
Conclusions
Machine learning and cryptography can be combined in order to implement a variety of
multi-party computational tasks such as third-party private search and private classification.
These methods can be efficient for computation over real-world medical data. In particular,
private-key fully homomorphic encryption can be efficiently implemented for classification
tasks.
The implementation of Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) encryption for private-key
fully homomorphic encryption was presented with multiple speed improvements. SingleInstruction Multiple Data (SIMD) parallelization was implemented in GKS in order to allow
for computation of multiple values at one time via multiple encodings within a single ciphertext. In total, up to 2n elements may be encoded in a single plaintext via a fully homomorphic
embedding for a plaintext ring with n generators. Furthermore, an algorithm for generating
the required parameters and change-of-basis transformations for implementation of the GKS
cryptosystem was described. Experimental performance results show that the GKS cryptosystem can be efficiently implemented via C++ using an arbitrary precision arithmetic
library.
Private Naive Bayes classification via private-key FHE was outlined and implemented
130

CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS

131

over real-world medical data. Classification of real-world medical data via private-key FHE
using Naive Bayes was carried out in less than half of a second. Furthermore, private Decision
Tree classification was carried out over an encrypted model in under one second.
A number of other protocols with potential use in future applications were developed
within this document. A privacy-preserving argmax protocol was outlined that enables
classification using a Naive Bayes model via private-key FHE. A third-party private search
algorithm was outlined that allows a Client to privately and efficiently perform a membership
query of a database without being given direct access to the database.

8.1

Future Work

The techniques outlined in this paper could be utilized on their own or in conjunction with
similar techniques in order to build tools that allow clinicians to privately classify their
patients’ data using models, which they cannot access in the clear. Proper pre-processing
techniques could create stronger and more efficiently computed models. Furthermore, medical researchers may use these models in order to determine if their models are over-fit to
their own data sets.
Further classification models of interest are Support Vector Machine (SVM) and deep
learning methods. Privacy-preserving classification methods implementing private-key fully
homomorphic encryption methods could be developed via these models and implemented
in the clinical setting along with the models described in this work. Furthermore, various
privacy-preserving bioinformatics techniques could be explored, and the privacy-preserving
decision tree classification could be extended to random forests.
Applications of interest for further study outside of the medical setting include personal
security as well as national security settings. Personal security protocols using fully homomorphic encryption could be spam filters for e-mail and private data mining of individual
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online behavior. Law enforcement could implement a version of third-party private search
in order to allow law enforcement officials to query a database stored in encrypted format
without access to that database or the decryption key.
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Appendix A
Third Party Private Search
Parameters
The Third Party Private Search protocol proposed in Chapter 6 includes a prediction error
in the form of false positives. Recall that the protocol implements three parameters: n,
the number of elements in the input database; q1 , the maximum bit size of values in the
database; and q2 , the bit size of the one-time pad implemented by the Client.
The values in the tables below display the fallout, given by

fallout =

#false positives
.
#false positives + #true negatives

This measure is chosen because during the protocol, no false negatives will occur. It is
necessary that parameters be chosen to avoid the case of false positives.
Experiments were run using the Monte Carlo method with various inputs for all three
parameters. During each test, 100, 000 experiments were performed. Algorithm 18 shows
the pseudocode for the experiments. In summary, for each experiment a database with n
random elements of at most q1 bits was generated for the Database Owner, and the Client’s
134
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value was set to another q1 bit integer. The Client’s value was chosen randomly under the
constraint that the Client’s value does not appear in the database. Then, a random q2 -bit
integer was chosen as the Client’s one-time pad and the third-party private search protocol
was performed. The experiment was implemented via Python 3.6.
Algorithm 18 Fallout Error Estimation
Input: Parameters n, q1 and q2 . Output: A boolean value 1 denoting a false positive or 0
denoting a true negative.
1:

Populate a random database D = {di }ni=1 with n random integers between 1 and 2q1 .

2:

Pick a random value c between 1 and 2q1 such that c 6∈ D.

3:

Pick a random q2 -bit value r.

4:

Compute the product
p=

n
Y

(c + r − di ).

i=1

5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

if r|p then
return 1.
else
return 0
end if

Tables A.1 and A.2 show the fallout resulting for input parameters n, q1 , and q2 .
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q2

q1 = 2

q1 = 3

q1 = 4

q1 = 5

q1 = 6

q1 = 7

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

0.41460
0.22381
0.10395
0.03768
0.01547
0.00596
0.00183
0.00067
0.00014
0
0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.72118
0.52138
0.313
0.172
0.09118
0.04517
0.02085
0.00968
0.00405
0.00186
0.0007
0.00025
0.0001
0.00005
0.00001
0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.86253 0.89877 0.91328 0.92093 0.92449 0.92553
0.70157 0.78353 0.81255 0.82663 0.83065 0.83624
0.46225 0.56652 0.62425 0.65258 0.66602 0.67098
0.30843 0.40693 0.47366 0.50564 0.52955 0.53678
0.18744 0.27385 0.3303 0.37508 0.39686 0.40954
0.11069 0.17915 0.22918 0.26606 0.28726 0.30213
0.05927 0.10907 0.14979 0.18012 0.20118 0.20953
0.03355 0.06601 0.0947 0.11892 0.13754 0.14909
0.01725 0.03872 0.05983 0.07888 0.09183 0.10067
0.00957 0.02123 0.03717 0.04983 0.06008 0.06735
0.00426 0.01153 0.02259 0.03105 0.03971 0.04398
0.00209 0.00603 0.01226 0.01853 0.02425 0.02889
0.00102 0.00387 0.00722 0.01186 0.01613 0.01871
0.0005 0.00157 0.00391 0.00711 0.00965 0.01156
0.00015 0.00085 0.00212 0.00351 0.0058 0.0072
0.0001 0.00054 0.00119 0.00223 0.00276 0.0044
0.00001
0.0002 0.00068 0.00115 0.00189 0.00268
0.00001 0.000011 0.00039 0.00075
0.001 0.00153
0 0.00004 0.0002 0.00026 0.00053 0.00091
0 0.00003 0.00006 0.00012 0.00043 0.00052
0 0.00001 0.00003 0.00013 0.00016 0.00025
0
0 0.00005 0.00008 0.00007 0.00019
0
0
0 0.00004 0.00005 0.00006
0
0
0
0 0.00003 0.00005
0
0 0.00001 0.00001
0 0.00004
0
0
0
0 0.00001 0.00003
0
0
0
0
0 0.00001
0
0
0
0
0 0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Table A.1: Fallout for n = 10

q1 = 8

q1 = 9
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q2

q1 = 10

q1 = 11

q1 = 12

q1 = 13

q1 = 14

q1 = 15

q1 = 16

q1 = 17

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

0.99951
0.9917
0.92762
0.83613
0.67544
0.54115
0.41004
0.30585
0.22153
0.15357
0.10642
0.07145
0.04811
0.03175
0.0207
0.01285
0.00844
0.00523
0.00286
0.00168
0.00095
0.00074
0.00039
0.00021
0.00011
0.00002
0.00003
0.00002
0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.99944
0.99218
0.92759
0.83924
0.67629
0.54548
0.41331
0.31239
0.22481
0.15952
0.1118
0.07646
0.05156
0.03241
0.02135
0.01476
0.00913
0.00526
0.00339
0.00214
0.00105
0.0008
0.0003
0.00026
0.00017
0.00009
0.00002
0.00004
0.00002
0.00001
0.00001
0
0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.99954
0.99232
0.92747
0.8383
0.68143
0.54469
0.41516
0.31338
0.2257
0.15982
0.11059
0.07802
0.05182
0.03556
0.02363
0.0148
0.00959
0.00611
0.00357
0.00243
0.00157
0.00097
0.00055
0.00036
0.00023
0.00007
0.00008
0.00004
0.00002
0.00002
0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.9994
0.99229
0.9266
0.84121
0.67705
0.54435
0.41628
0.31307
0.22458
0.16164
0.11336
0.08019
0.05294
0.03594
0.0235
0.0154
0.00961
0.00564
0.00408
0.00235
0.00183
0.00092
0.00059
0.00032
0.00016
0.00012
0.00003
0.00001
0.00001
0.00002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.99951
0.99204
0.92638
0.84102
0.67762
0.54454
0.41832
0.31209
0.22748
0.16195
0.11524
0.07843
0.0539
0.03569
0.02402
0.01509
0.01069
0.0066
0.00414
0.00297
0.00145
0.0009
0.00055
0.0004
0.0002
0.0001
0.00006
0.00003
0.00005
0.00002
0
0
0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.99953
0.99184
0.92845
0.83971
0.67795
0.54413
0.41945
0.31094
0.23065
0.16376
0.11457
0.07957
0.05299
0.03709
0.0238
0.01694
0.01059
0.00681
0.00444
0.00287
0.00151
0.00094
0.00065
0.00039
0.00022
0.00015
0.0001
0.00005
0.00003
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.99954
0.99193
0.928
0.83775
0.67924
0.54639
0.41608
0.31166
0.22765
0.16297
0.11459
0.07935
0.05415
0.0358
0.02505
0.01602
0.01075
0.00654
0.00423
0.00267
0.0019
0.00103
0.00066
0.0004
0.0003
0.0001
0.0001
0.00002
0.00006
0.00003
0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.99937
0.99179
0.92831
0.83847
0.67743
0.54424
0.41557
0.31321
0.22604
0.16129
0.11353
0.08035
0.05276
0.03773
0.02495
0.01656
0.01047
0.00719
0.0041
0.00268
0.00175
0.00119
0.0006
0.00052
0.00021
0.00015
0.00011
0.00004
0.00007
0.00001
0.00002
0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table A.2: Fallout for n = 10, continued
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